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4 March 1983

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## BARE MAJORITY IN POLL EXPRESS OPPOSITION TO NATO MISSILES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 17 Jan 83 p 5

[Article by Asger Schultz, Director of Danish Gallup Institute]

[Text] Even among NATO supporters there is only a slim majority in favor of the deployment of new missiles in Western Europe in response to the new Russian missiles. Half the population as a whole believe NATO's missile strategy is wrong.

This was indicated by a survey taken by the Gallup Institute to discover what people think about plans to deploy new missiles in Western Europe.

A representative sampling of the adult population including 1,000 respondents was asked, first of all, the question: "In recent years Russia has deployed several hundred nuclear missiles capable of striking targets throughout Western Europe. As a countermeasure, NATO has decided to deploy a series of nuclear missiles in Western Europe. Do you believe it is right or wrong to deploy these missiles in Western Europe in response to the Russian missiles?"

	right %	wrong %	do not know %	total %
Total	32	51	17	100
For or against membership in NATO				
For	52	37	11	100
Against	4	88	7	100
Do not know	13	50	37	100
Party affiliation				
To the right of the Social Democrats	55	31	14	100
Social Democrat	21	65	14	100

	right, %	wrong, %	do not know, %	total, %
To the left of the Social Democrats	6	88	6	100
Men	42	48	10	100
Women	23	54	23	100
Age:				
15 to 24	24	57	19	100
25 to 39	31	58	11	100
40 to 59	37	47	16	100
60 and over	35	44	21	100

A slim majority (51 percent) opposes the deployment of new missiles in Western Europe and even among NATO supporters there is only a slight majority (52 percent) for deployment of the missiles.

It is not surprising that opposition is strong among voters to the left of center, but it is noteworthy that one third of the nonsocialist voter (31 percent) are against deployment of the missiles, even though the majority (55 percent) supports the missiles.

As might be expected, the opposition is greatest among young people, but it is interesting to note that women oppose the missiles much more than men. While the men are about evenly divided on the issue (42 percent for and 48 percent against), there is a majority against the missiles. Among women, however, between two and three times as many oppose as support the missiles (54 percent and 23 percent, respectively).

One reason for opposing the missiles is that not deploying them would promote peace and have a pacifying effect on the Soviet Union. For this reason, the following question was asked:

"If Western Europe does not deploy these nuclear missiles, Russian will enjoy considerable military superiority. In this situation, do you believe that Russia will become more peaceful or do you believe that Russian would use its military superiority for political ends?"

Here is the answer:

	become more peaceful, %	use politically, %	do not know, %	total
Total	36	31	33	100
For or against NATO membership				
For	36	34	30	100
Against	47	30	23	100
Do not know	19	26	55	100
Party affiliation				
To the right of the Social Democrats	33	32	35	100
Social Democrat	36	33	31	100
To the left of the Social Democrats	54	17	29	100
Men	40	33	27	100
Women	33	29	38	100
Age groups:				
15 to 24	33	38	29	100
25 to 39	41	24	35	100
40 to 59	33	38	29	100
60 and over	36	26	38	100

As seen in the table, opposition to missiles is not based on confidence in the pacifying effect on the Soviet Union. Only one third (36 percent) believe this, while almost as many (31 percent) believe, on the contrary, that the Soviet would use the situation politically and one third (33 percent) do not know.

Leftist voters have the greatest confidence that the Soviet Union would not take advantage of its military superiority, although many do not know (29 percent).

Since a Western European refusal to deploy new missiles must be seen in the light of NATO cooperation, the following question was asked:

"If Russian attacked Western Europe, do you believe that the United States would come to the aid of Western Europe?"

	yes %	no %	do not know, %	total %
Total	74	11	15	100
For or against NATO membership				
For	85	8	7	100
Against	65	21	14	100
Do not know	55	11	34	100
Party affiliation				
To the right of the Social Democrats	85	6	9	100
Social Democrat	67	19	14	100
To the left of the Social Democrats	73	15	12	100

A large majority (74 percent) believes that the United States would help Western Europe if trouble arose and, as seen in the table, this is true of both supporters and opponents of NATO. It also is true, as seen in the table, regardless of party affiliation.

Thus, it may be concluded that, from the standpoint of security policy, most people support NATO cooperation while, in reality, they are counting on help from the United States in case of a Soviet threat.

Thus, although the majority rejects the new missiles, it is only under the assumption that they can rely on the United States for help.

May be reproduced only if BERLINGSKE TIDENDE and the Gallup Institute are indicated as sources.

9336

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## BAUDISSLIN ASSESSES ANDROPOV'S PROPOSALS, ZERO OPTION

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 22 Jan 83 p 7

[Interview by Vanna Vannuccini with Wolfgang Baudissin, director of the Security Research Institute of Hamburg: "NATO, by Agreement, Could Accept a Reduced Euromissile System"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Bonn, 21 January--We asked Wolfgang Baudissin, retired Bundeswehr general and director of the Security Research Institute of the University of Hamburg, for an evaluation of Yuri Andropov's proposals as explained in Bonn by Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Gromyko.

[Answer] These proposals are a mixture of old and new, of openings and closings, of forthcomingness and threats. This is the fate of all public declarations that are directed to different recipients. Andropov must, on the one hand, tranquilize the bureaucrats in Moscow and not give them the impression of giving in to the West; he must demonstrate to the Eastern-bloc allies that the USSR is the guide; he must take account of Western public opinion and the public opinion of the nonaligned countries, and he must take the NATO governments into account. Because of this, it is all the more important for the West, with truly serious negotiations, to make it clear what lies behind these proposals and on what points the Kremlin is truly disposed to a compromise. It therefore seems important to me for the Americans to come to agreement now with the European allies on what they really want: what hopes are possible and what compromises are unacceptable. I hope that Vice President Bush comes to Europe bringing new proposals that can serve as a basis for the talks with the NATO partners.

[Question] Francois Mitterrand stated in his speech to the Bundestag yesterday that the French weapons cannot in any way enter into the accounting of the East-West balance. Is a compromise in Geneva possible without taking the French and British arsenals into account?

[Answer] Discord among the Allies

This involves an old problem, one that had already emerged in the time of the SALT agreements. The Russians have always tried to put the French and British nuclear arsenals into the accounting, if for no other reason than to sow discord among the Western allies. The position of the French is that it will be pos-

sible to talk about their position only when the two superpowers have reduced their own arsenals to the dimensions of the French one. The English are less radical. In my judgment, a "zero plus X" solution should be possible in Geneva. The superpowers could agree on a certain number, probably with the stationing of a few Pershing II's and withdrawal of the largest possible number of SS-20's. A provisional agreement is the best solution, with shifting of the definitive solution to the START negotiations. There, it would be easier to get the French and British weapons into the accounting framework. The relatively few French and British missiles would in fact enter the picture in far higher magnitudes, on the order of 1,500 nuclear systems.

[Question] The Soviet Union declares for the first time that it is disposed to negotiate on short-range missiles. How should the West respond?

[Answer] It would be very important for negotiations to be opened on these weapons also. However, the same difficulty arises again here: negotiate up to what point? To what extent are the short-range missiles to be viewed separately from the relationships of conventional forces? If the Soviet relative superiority in the conventional-weapons sector remains unaltered, the possibility of the West's agreeing on reductions and concessions on the short-range weapons is minimal. One has to look at the total picture. On both sides there is a gigantic military potential, one that cannot be dealt with as an overall package, and because of this it has been divided into smaller packages. But artificial ones. A negotiation on short-range missiles would fundamentally depend, for example, on the results of the Vienna negotiations on reduction of conventional forces.

[Question] The SPD is asking the United States to abandon the "zero option," an option that had been explained to German public opinion by Helmut Schmidt himself as a great negotiating offer by the West to Moscow. Wouldn't it have been better to avoid, from the beginning, investing so much capital in the zero option, just so as not to irritate the Americans, when no one ever really held that it involved a serious negotiating objective?

[Answer] The "Grey Area"

As a maximum objective, it is correct to say that we do not want Euromissiles, either Soviet or American. Originally, Schmidt had warned the two superpowers against neglecting the "grey area" of European armaments, dealing only with strategic weapons in the SALT negotiations and therefore leaving room for the suspicion that the Americans wanted to uncouple their security from European security. My old proposal--do not deal with already operational systems but rather nip the rearmament spiral in the bud, through negotiations--found expression in NATO's "double decision."

The difficulty is that the Soviets have already installed 333 Euromissiles, and the West, none. The zero option was not an idea of Schmidt's but rather an American invention. The problem for the SPD now is to keep faith with NATO's double decision. Whether it is considered correct or not, that decision was taken at the conclusion of 2, 3 years of high-level discussions within NATO, discussions in which all the allies, including the Americans, had to make con-



cessions. Distancing oneself from them now would mean losing credibility within the Alliance, apart from the fact that I am personally convinced that only by holding firm to it did Schmidt succeed in bringing Moscow and Washington to the negotiating table.

[Question] What is the significance of the renunciation of the use of force proposed to the West by the Warsaw Pact?

[Answer] This proposal could indicate a significant change on the Soviet side. Steps forward seem possible as regards the negotiating on conventional weapons also. Up to now, the Soviets' reasoning has been: these forces are historically determined and have helped to maintain the peace in Europe; therefore we are not disposed to talk about asymmetrical reduction. Now it is to be hoped that the situation has changed.

[Question] There are suggestions from Warsaw that Andropov will be more inclined toward compromise when he has consolidated his power more firmly, and that to this end, a "de-Brezhnevization" of the apparatus is taking shape in the USSR, apparently having begun already with the shuffling of Valentin Falin and Leonid Zameyatin. What do you think about this?

[Answer] From Stalin to Brezhnev

The difficulty with the communist regimes is that there is no procedure for succession, and history, from Stalin to Brezhnev, teaches us that everyone has had to be very cautious until getting power firmly in hand. What is more, Andropov was named with the support of the military bureaucracy and will certainly not want to run the risk of falling out with it. Therefore, beyond the matter of good will, there is no doubt but that we cannot expect great concessions in the beginning.

11267

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## NEONAZIS SUSPECTED IN LATEST ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST ACTS

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 28 Jan 83 p 5

[Article by Dietrich Strothmann: "Brown Bomb Trail"]

[Text] As always, there was good reason for suspicion. The bombings of "installations of the U.S. Army" in Hesse last November and December were quickly blamed on the RAF and the "revolutionary cells." After all, both of these had struck in the preceding weeks and months—for a total of more than 50 times over the past year—with bombs against the European headquarters of the U.S. Air Force at Ramstein, against high-ranking officers and parked cars of American GI's. After the bombings, local newspapers almost without exception would receive "confessional letters" from the well-known radical leftwing commandos, saying "it was us!" And so, the quick assumption was that these very same "after-hours guerillas" were also responsible for placing bombs underneath the driver's seats of GI-owned automobiles in the underground garage of an Eschborn hi-rise on 14 November (where it was discovered in time), on 14 December in Butzbach and Fechenheim and on 15 December in Darmstadt (two of which went off and severely injured the owners). Who else should it have been?

But, in the case of these most recent bombings not a single clue of the almost 500 traced definitely pointed to the left. The terrorist acts were not followed by the customary confessional letters, nor did the manner of execution correspond to previous practice. On the contrary—these bombs were meant to kill quickly and indiscriminately and not to frighten "in a targeted manner."

This is a new feature in the more recent history of terrorism. As opposed to previous practice, these criminals had factored in the possibility of killing "innocent bystanders," such as the soldiers' wives and children. In the 24-story apartment house in Eschborn, for example, which contains 250 flats housing 800 people, the explosion would have caused a fire endangering a large number of civilians. The soldiers' wives might also have used the automobiles to take their children to school. The explosives were packed into fire extinguishers and provided with "firing pins" which would have made them go off the moment the light switch was activated. Earlier bombs had been in the form of stick bombs with timers. The bombs then went off and set fire to the parked cars at night or on the weekend "so as under no circumstances to endanger the innocent," as one of the "revolutionary cells" letters said.

It was the Hamburg office for the protection of the constitution, which has some experience in dealing with Neonazis, which first surmised that the trail of the anti-American assailants in November and December would not lead them to the "autonomous militants" of the left but rather to the brown end of the political spectrum.

One reason they thought so was that the dispersed adherents of the two outlawed terrorist organizations "Army Sports Group Hoffmann" and the "German People's Socialist Movement" were regrouping particularly in Hesse. Both groups have experience in handling weapons and explosives and have never made a secret of their hatred for America.

The second reason was that they were aware of the fact that the "firing pins" used in three of the bombings are the same as those provided in do-it-yourself toy rocket kits that are sold commercially.

The third reason was that the terrorists of the radical left jealously pay heed to subtle differences. One of their leaflets, recently distributed in some well-known Darmstadt pubs, blamed the attacks on the /Guerilla Diffusa/ as well as the "fascos." The leaflet is entitled: "To Draw a Line Between Us and the Enemy" and has the RAF star on it. It claims that "some openly fascist groups had their dirty fingers in it," intending to "blame their filthy deeds" against "run-of-the-mill GI's on us and to have fascist acts appear alongside leftwing attacks on the wanted posters."

By putting out this leaflet, the terrorists of the radical left are trying to prevent "our goals from being obfuscated" and to make clear "who we are and what we are after." In addition to turning their backs on endangering "the innocent," they say they will not perpetrate acts they cannot "communicate" propagandistically or that would serve to undermine their "fighting mission against imperialism and Zionism."

From an "ideological" point of view, too, the three bombings point in the direction of right-wing radicalism. In that arena, a vehement controversy has just broken out between Hamburg Neonazi leader Michael Kuehnen, just released from jail, and the remaining mercenaries of the two outlawed groups. The latter are opposed to Kuehnen's "Hitlerism" and "uniform fetishism" and are calling for an "anti-imperialist struggle of liberation" to be waged primarily against the Americans. These men are active in the Offenburg area; they either belonged to the Hoffmann group or the "People's Socialist Movement" of Friedhelm Duse from Munich and believe in old-style national bolshevism which espouses a "neutral Germany which lives in peace and friendship with the Soviet Union."

These "leftwing" radicals of the right have secretly distributed a pamphlet which in turn has elicited a reply from Kuehnen who labels them "putschist adventurers." "It would be worthwhile, we think, to compare Russian officers with FRG officers," the pamphlet says. "Then one can see on which side the 'sub-humans' are—not to mention the American soldiers, of course." The hatred of America on the part of the Nazi terrorists conforms to the text of a leaflet by the "Young National Democrats," the youth wing of the NPD which says: "You are worrying about apartment houses being occupied. We are worried about our occupied homeland!"

The right-wing Hydra, too, is growing new heads all the time. There is Manfred Roeder who threw bombs at refugees and who is in prison now; Frank Schubart who killed two Swiss border guards before committing suicide himself; Gundolf Koehler who caused a bloodbath at the Munich Oktoberfest and was killed in the process; Helmut Omer who shot and killed two black soldiers in front of a Nuremberg discotheque and then committed suicide—all of them have long since been succeeded by others just as terrifying.

9478

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## BADINTER ON EXTRADITION, ORGANIZED CRIME, JUDICIARY

Paris REVOLUTION in French 7 Jan 83 pp 58-62

[Interview with Minister of Justice Robert Badinter, by Richard Michel; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] Mr Minister, there are those who claim that if you are alone, it is because your policies are not realistic. Is that your opinion?

[Answer] The characteristic trait of the policies I follow is precisely that they are realistic, while responding to needs, that they are based on real facts. Let us be specific: If it is a matter of reducing crime, I have always said that one could not speak of it as one would a disease. One cannot talk of "the disease," but rather, of tuberculosis, the flu, a head cold. One does not treat a head cold and cancer in the same way. Well, when I hear people talk about crime or delinquency in general, it makes my hair stand on end! A doctor would react in the same way if one spoke to him about "the disease." There are phenomena of delinquency, types of crime, and the response of a society must be adapted.

Realistic? Yes, I am still realistic, while making the distinction that an overgeneralization omits. On the one hand, you have major crime, organized crime and wrongdoing -- that is, those who plot to fight against society, in short, those who are described by the generic term "Mafia." Naturally, we do not have the same dimensions that one sees in Italy or the United States, but nevertheless, these are groups of men who organize for crime and major wrongdoing.

[Question] And knowing the law full well?

[Answer] Yes, knowing the law full well, as professionals. They thus declare themselves veritably at war with society. In a democratic society, there can be but one response to such aggression: firmness. I have always said that. There is no other language. Proof of that firmness is that today, you have more criminals being held in French prisons than under my predecessor.

[Question] Nevertheless, one does have the impression that the corps of judges is among those that resist change the most. In the police, there is at least an open struggle, but in the judiciary....

[Answer] In a democratic country and in a nation of law, as I conceive of it, the courts, those who rule, must be totally independent. It is one thing to like or not like the decisions handed down, but if one begins to say that the courts should not be independent of political power, then freedom is done with. Judges are responsible for their decisions. On that basis, one sees judicial conduct linked to that independence, which is a safeguard of freedoms even if the decisions handed down by the courts give rise to criticism. Personally, I have made a rule for myself: I have never commented on a legal decision, and yet, there are some on which I would have a great deal to say. I shall never intervene in what the presiding judge says. But traditionally speaking, the French do not believe in the independence of their justice because they are convinced that it is subordinate to political power. That is not true, but the result is that I am criticized for decisions which by definition are made in complete freedom by the judges, which is actually paradoxical.

[Question] Mr Minister, you may not know that some magistrates complain of the attitude of certain courts that drag their feet in innovating.

[Answer] On that point, let us be clear. I have defined in circulars the lines of penal policy of which you are aware. I have had in-depth meetings with attorneys general on penal policy. I reject the idea that there might be a kind of blockage of the judicial institution. I do not believe it. I know the judicial world. That passion and different sensitivities might sharpen criticisms here and there is understandable. But I reject the idea of a hostility on the part of the courts to a judicial policy which, on the whole, corresponds to what it deems to be the best response itself. But it is difficult, particularly with respect to temporary detention. Inadequate personnel has something to do with it.

Actually, trials take a long time and in the end, temporary detention is longer.

[Question] Newsmen have recently seen you as a sometimes bitter man. How do you explain that?

[Answer] I am not going to repeat what I have already said several times. But let us take that historic decision of the leftist government: the abolition of the death penalty. For 100 years, since the Dreyfus affair, in the field of justice, it was a decision of great importance, but after that historic decision was made, you could scarcely find any leftist editorialist to welcome it, to emphasize that a great moral victory had just been won. And yet, it was the end of a long struggle to which the left should have borne witness. In short, people do not take the measure of our victories. Likewise, the lifting of reservations from Article 25 of the European Convention was one more victory of the left, but it was not hailed. People do not measure the scope of this progress in freedoms and it is a great shame.

[Question] Actually, one would be wrong to underestimate such considerable historic progress, but what about daily justice?



[Answer] I know that a great deal remains to be done. I am convinced that day-to-day justice has to be transformed. That is my priority for 1983.

It is not easy, but it is necessary. Why? Because judicial activity is closely linked to the developments in social life. The number of laws and regulations is constantly increasing. We police -- in the good sense of the word -- social life. This society, with such a tightly woven system of obligations, results in individual awareness of rights -- I find this quite proper -- and therefore, to a determination to take advantage of them. This is new because our grandparents were more inclined to bow their heads. Today, we have the opposite situation and this is better, provided that we do not come to forms of violence. Making use of one's rights is the first right of a man in a democracy. This means that one can exercise them totally. On this subject -- and these are measures which the left has taken and of which not enough has been said -- we have increased legal aid to the poor. Add to these factors and economic crisis and you have the sources of judicial inflation. The repercussions are numerous. Look at what is happening in the rental sector, in consumer buying, in social affairs. The mass of litigation has become enormous and the old legal machinery is overwhelmed. Whence the kind of moodiness that creeps over the judicial body, loaded with work and often not well liked.

In the face of such a situation, either we find new means of handling these legal matters or the machine will break down by itself. We have a stifling sort of justice. In order to meet the situation, I have drawn up a plan to recruit more judges. I am intensifying efforts in order to make use of computers. But this will not change things if we do not invent new ways of settling conflicts which will naturally respect the rights of the defense. Must we not develop conciliation within the judicial institution itself, for example? Must we not invent much faster procedural means in order to handle consumer disputes? What we have here is a kind of denial of justice. In short, there is a kind of judicial revolution to begin. That will be difficult, I know, because there are ways of thinking, habits and interest that clash. It was Lenin who said that jurists are conservative. That is true because they always look at the decisions of those who went before. One always rules in terms of what was ruled before. This is not a projective intellectual approach.

[Question] If, indeed, one understands the need to propose new procedures, does this not imply asking judges to be less cut off from social life?

[Answer] You are right; the palace doors must be opened. In legal terms, one says "le For" to designate the place of competence. Well, "le For" must once again become a forum. The court must be reintegrated into the city. Naturally, it is not enough to simply open the doors; we must welcome those in the system. Furthermore, beyond daily court life, the citizens, associations and unions must discover what their justice is and how it operates.

[Question] Yes, but does that not also mean that the judges must emerge from the palace?

[Answer] One does not go without the other. The judges must mingle more in the life of the city. They quite rightly reply that such a thing is difficult because of the fact that they are so overloaded. But I am nevertheless convinced that we can change the relationship of the French with their justice. Whence my policy of welcoming the "legal subjects" into the palace and whence my determination to set up a maximum number of legal offices to serve the public. That may seem insignificant, but it is important to the citizens. For me, with 1 percent of the national budget, every franc counts and must be used in the most effective fashion.

[Question] In the final analysis, you would want judges to be, not only the guardians of the established order, but spoilsports?

[Answer] No, not spoilsports. But they must play an essential role. As we know, a living society is a society of conflicts. Therefore, either these conflicts must be resolved peacefully -- and this takes place within the framework of the legal institutions or through conciliation, and tension is defused -- or, if that function is not fulfilled, you have an explosion and that is it for freedoms. That is the current challenge facing the courts.

[Question] In spite of everything and even now, do you not believe that the balance is tipped in favor of the disadvantaged or the poor?

[Answer] I do not know if one can see things that way. If you take individual cases, you will note that there was not always any particular leniency in the system with regard to those belonging to the bourgeoisie. The worst thing for the accused person is to be a young, rich bourgeois person on the stand. At the present time, all feeling is against him, much more than if it were a matter of a young worker.

Everyone says: "He has had every chance in life and there he sits." Actually, the legal institution has been oriented toward a certain type of maintenance of order. This maintenance of order was oriented toward what a politician on the right would call the "dangerous classes." By definition, they are not the rich. Legal treatment fit into that framework.

Finally, judging economic crime is a complex problem. Financial affairs are not treated with the same ease as a holdup. One must discover the mechanisms and specialized judges, experts, means are needed. The legal institution is very poor here. I have taken measures in connection with this point. First of all, I have outlined the line of demarcation. I have asked that the courts not dwell on small-scale economic crime. Do we have to bring the little bankrupt who did not file his balance sheet on time into criminal court? Certainly not.

He has already gone bankrupt and he does not need more punishment in the criminal courts! That would be absurd.

What is important is for the legal institution to mobilize its forces in order to fight major economic crime often linked with major crime. Throughout gambling, drug trafficking, one finds both. It is a form of organized crime

and for the most well-organized criminals -- that is, the Mafia -- major economic crime has long been mixed with major crime in all aspects. We must therefore aim our efforts in that direction. We have made progress. As early as October 1981, I asked that prosecutors be present in all commercial courts. I have also asked that in the National Magistracy School, the training of economic specialists be intensified.

The idea that the legal institution would be soft on white-collar crime is therefore erroneous. But it is true that the judicial machine must be better equipped to fight major organized economic crime. Having said that much, I would point out that contrary to what the right has said, the 1981 amnesty law was not a law from which employers were excluded. They were treated worse by Giscard d'Estaing in 1974 than by Francois Mitterrand. I myself wanted small bankrupts to receive amnesty. That was not the case in 1974.

[Question] Your recent proposals to your colleagues in countries belonging to the EEC, to wit, the drafting of an extradition agreement and the establishment of a European court, were a step backward, especially when one is aware of the repressive nature of the judicial systems of some of our neighbors. Would you not agree? Is there not a danger of once again resorting to an exceptional jurisdiction?

[Answer] That is not true. I regret to say that we are not the most progressive in the field of judicial freedoms. Let us not confuse the special texts that arise at a given moment in a democracy because of terrorist movements as serious as those seen in Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, with daily judicial reality. Some neighboring countries have judicial systems in which freedoms are as well guaranteed as in our own country.

On the European extradition agreement, we must be specific. The president of the republic let it be known that we would never sign the Dublin agreement because we consider it to be dangerous to freedoms. We shall therefore not ratify the Dublin or Strasbourg conventions. But one cannot allow, when organized crime is growing throughout Europe, European countries to remain bound by 1880-type extradition agreements. Certain modern infractions of an economic nature -- pollution, for example -- are not contained in these conventions. Consequently, it is not possible for us not to put new agreements into effect. In this connection, I hope that there will be only one type of European extradition agreement that will cover, not only all these new infractions, but also the criteria for extradition that we have defined ourselves and that in many ways are the greatest protection for the freedoms of all West Europe.

[Question] When, on 25 March 1982, you presented a plaque in memory of Judge Michel, you said: "Justice is thwarted every time a criminal is not identified or foiled." Today, the murderers of Judge Michel, those who ordered the crime, are still free. Justice is therefore thwarted. No one accepts this, especially you, but to what extent is this true?

[Answer] It is also true for Judge Renaud. The murder of magistrates is a mortal challenge to justice. We have not yet succeeded. And yet, it is not for lack of trying, speaking about the courts as well as the police. But



murder for hire is the most difficult thing to prove. As you know, the rate of clarification in criminal cases is 50 percent. For major cases, among the reforms I look to in penal procedure is the duality of the examining magistrate, in order to reduce the risk of murder. Judge Renaud died because he knew too much and only he knew it. Second, we must proceed quickly. An immense load for a single man means blocking other cases for which he is also responsible. Finally, solitude is bad company here. I believe that in certain cases, we shall have to move toward teams of judges.

[Question] "Political leeway is the worst kind of leeway for the judicial institution," you have said. It would appear that you have more love for the law than for politics. You are still involved in politics because you belong to a leftist government. What exactly does politics mean for you, especially in view of the attacks of which you are the target?

[Answer] It is true that I am not a career politician. I do not expect to become a deputy, mayor or have any other important duties within a political parties. I do not expect it because a man's life is limited and each person must do what he deems most useful. As for myself, I have devoted myself entirely to problems of justice. But I am not a man who wears blinkers; I know that justice is part of society. If I chose the left, it was not by accident or out of any benefit I might derive. Socially speaking, I had no reason to do so. I moved to the left for two reasons: The first is linked to my adolescent experience. Growing up during World War II, what I saw during that time (and I felt it all the more intensely because I am a Jew) was that the triumphant expression of the right was the Vichy government. That marked me for always. That does not mean that all rightists were Vichyites; there were many in the Resistance. But the triumphant expression of the French right was Vichy. The second reason is that I realized that it was not possible to transform justice -- which has always been my passion -- without a profound movement in society. Now then, while I do know -- and this might seem curious -- men on the right who have a sense of justice, which should put them on the left, there is no hope of political movement for the transformation of justice on the right.

It is impossible. Consequently, I am not outside the political movement. But I do not participate in political life on a daily basis in the sense in which it is traditionally interpreted.

11,464

CSO: 3519/285

## TFSC ASKS CONSIDERATION AS FREE TRADE ZONE

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 19 Jan 83 p 4

[Text] With free zone efforts under way in Turkey, TFSC Minister of Labor and Cooperatives Ismet Kotak said, "As this matter has come up in Turkey, the existence of a free zone in northern Cyprus must be taken into account." Stating that the TFSC's free zone in Famagusta port had stimulated interest in the Middle East and Western Europe because of the city's location, Kotak noted that the port has long been a popular one and its expanded opportunities had increased this interest.

Kotak, also TSFC minister of industry, said that applications for important projects in the free zone had come from Britain and Arab countries, adding, "However, the question all of them ask is whether the zone has a given number of years' exemption from all income and corporation taxes, duties and fees."

Stressing that various countries offer tax immunity in free zones, Kotak said that competition determines the duration of this tax immunity, that some extend up to 5 or 10 years while some countries levy no taxes at all.

"We think it would be beneficial to set the immunity period in the TFSC in parallel with Turkey. We are watching the efforts in Turkey," Kotak said, adding that preparations had been in progress since 1979 for expanding the free port and zone law now in effect in the TFSC and an amendment had been drawn up on the basis of experience afforded by the initial implementation.

Minister Kotak noted that the amendment would allow protection of the zone, speeding up procedures and clarification of tax immunities.

The northern sector of Famagusta Port was declared a free port and 350 square meters of adjacent land, a free zone by a law placed in effect in 1977. A section having 655 meters of docks where 30,000-ton ships can load and unload was designated for the free port.

8349

CSO: 3554/131

## REORGANIZATION OF STEEL COMPANIES SEEN AS ADVANTAGEOUS

Zurich NEUE ZUERICHER ZEITUNG in German 28 Jan 83 p 12

[Article: "Reorganization of the German Steel Industry; Billions and Rapid Action Are Needed"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] Hardly any commentator can escape the /inner logic/ of the restructuring plan for the German steel industry, which was presented by three experts on Tuesday (see NEUE ZUERICHER ZEITUNG, No 21). This "moderators' report"--it came into being on /instructions from the iron and steel producing industry/ and with the /blessing/ of the minister for economics--proposes the creation of two new groups of companies which are to take the place of up to five independent concerns. Within the framework of their 8-week-long activity the independent experts, who because of their previous or present activity are very familiar with the problems of the steel industry, had to satisfy a /large number of subsidiary conditions/. In the end they presented a solution within whose scope /no existing steel location is to be abandoned/ and in which--in spite of reduction in capacity--/balanced production structures/ can be maintained.

The starting point of the considerations was the year 1981, in which Germany produced 38 million metric tons of steel for domestic consumption and 4 million metric tons for export. In their work the moderators were guided by certain objectives: For major products at least two /independent suppliers of equal rank/ should operate in the marketplace. Over and above this, the large suppliers should have at their disposal a broad range of the essential products. Finally, care was to be taken that no group was granted /predominance/ vis a vis other comparable amalgamations. This resulted in the division into groups--with Thyssen and Krupp on one side ("The Rhine Group") and Hoesch, Gloeckner and Peine-Salzgitter ("The Ruhr Group") on the other--in which the production of flat steel and of heavy sections is to proceed. The moderators point out that this division, in which approximately three hot strip sheet rolling mills will be in each of the two groups, is superior to any other imaginable combination. In the two new groups 466,000 metric tons of flat steel ("Rhine") and 461,000 metric tons ("Ruhr") of heavy sections are to be produced per month. If future market developments require /further

capacity adjustments/ this could be accomplished by shutting down one rolling mill in each group. Inasmuch as /light steel sections/ are also produced by other companies (especially Korf and Arbed-Saarstahl) which do not belong to either of the above-mentioned groups, a separate solution is proposed for this area. The companies remain independent, but their production is to be coordinated for each by means of sales companies.

In the short term the formation of /sales companies/ is to occupy a key position for the "Rhine" and "Ruhr" groups as well. Inasmuch as the necessary company amalgamations may take up to 3 years, the formation of sales companies is intended to achieve early /efficiency improvements/ in the preliminary stage. Joint sales, it is hoped, will achieve price stabilization in all markets. Furthermore, the sales companies are supposed to play a part in the required coordination of sales, production and investment planning of the respective affiliated companies.

According to the experts' estimate, the reduction and consolidation of steel capacities should result in /cost reductions/ of DM 50 to 100 per metric ton of raw steel. Referred to the entire branch of industry, this should be equal to a cost improvement of DM 2 to 3 billion. On the other hand, concrete figures on the related /reduction in the number of jobs/ are not given. Instead, it was learned that one-time state /subsidies/ are expected in the amount of DM 2 to 3 billion as well. Moreover, Bonn and the European Community are demanding, for their protection, /strict adherence to price and quantity regulations/. Should the European subsidy race, which is also seen by the three moderators as the cause of the acute crisis in the FRG, not stop, the levying of /compensatory customs duties/ will become necessary.

So much for the nonbinding concept for reorganization of the German steel landscape, which without doubt is also based on suggestions by the companies. The /demands/ upon the company directors, who to some extent have to be the leopards who change their spots, are high. Unions and politicians of the Laender have to give their blessing to the necessary reduction of jobs. The problems of the subsidy case of /Arbed-Saarstahl/ and the /Korf Group/ under receivership do not appear to be solved in any way. While the two Korf steel plants are considered to be basically sound, they are nevertheless--just like Saarstahl--merely fitted into the moderators' concept via sales companies. And last, there is a tough nut remaining for Bonn to crack because now twice the amount of funds provided for in the financial planning up to 1985 has to be made available for the steel branch.

5586

CSO: 3620/188

## NATIONALIZATION OF FRENCH MINING COMPANY ANNOUNCED

Paris LE MONDE in French 15 Feb 83 p 42

[Article by Marc Marceau]

[Text] The French Lavrion Mines company, established in Greece, a subsidiary of the Pennaroya enterprise, has been nationalized. Kostas Vaitzos, state secretary for national economy, indicated that the state, the Lavrion city hall and the approximately 200 workers of the mine would become co-owners of this company, which had closed its doors in the spring of 1982 for lack of profits. The firm, which will henceforth be known as Hellenic Metallurgic Industry, will deal primarily in lead and silver.

If the Lavrion Mine company is not present on the list of the most important and profitable industrial enterprises, it nevertheless is deeply engraved in the collective memory of Greeks. Located near the cape of Sounion, south of Athens, it is one of the most remarkable examples of the permanence, throughout the centuries, of the interest presented by a mining region, always seeming to have dried up, but constantly being reborn under one form or another.

From 480 B.C. to 300 B.C., the deposits of argentiferous lead were among the richest in the world. Many tens of thousands of slaves worked in the mines for an annual average production of 2,000 tons of lead and 6,000 kilos of silver. During the 4th century, the political decadence of Athens, the absence of capital and of commercial outlets, as well as the discovery of new mines in Thraki and Asia Minor relegated the mines into oblivion until 1867. In 1875, a group of French financiers reopened the mines, which provided work for 2,500 persons.

Work and living conditions were no better than those of the slaves in antiquity. Spontaneous strikes erupted beginning in 1883. Unorganized workers rebelled against their exploitation: 12 to 13 hours of work a day for 2 or 3 drachmas. From 8 to 21 April 1896 a veritable revolt, which ended tragically was a turning point in the history of trade unionism and workers' struggles in Greece.

Today, the Lavrion Mines are a symbol for the socialist power attempting its first experiment in self-management. But with deposits nearly exhausted, an incomplete technological reconversion and a rather unfavorable world market, it remains to be seen whether managers will be able to face and overcome so many difficult problems.

CSO: 3419/325

## VIEWS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF FREE PORTS, TRADE ZONES

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 16 Jan 83 p 6

[Interview with economist Taner Berksoy by Osman Ulagay]

[Text] Who is Taner Berksoy?

He was born in 1934. After graduation by the Istanbul University Faculty of Economics, he obtained his doctorate at Cambridge in England. He is now an assistant professor at Hacettepe University's Faculty of Economics. The author of many articles and books, Berksoy has attracted notice with his book "Export-Oriented Industrialization in Less Developed Nations."

[Question] Mr Berksoy, free zones have become one of the hottest topics of conversation in our country, with the press joining in, in recent weeks. I think the concepts free port, free trade zone and industrial free zone which, actually, are all different things, are frequently confused and most people still do not understand what a free zone is, or is not. This is why my first question to you is: What does free zone mean and is it possible to speak of several kinds of free zones?

[Answer] This is perhaps one of the most important aspects of the issue. There is a great deal of difference between the types of free zones. It is possible to divide them into two types in general. One is the kind most often known as free ports, which we can refer to more generally as free trade zones. The other is free production or free export zones where production processing takes place directly. There are important differences between these two types as to historical development as well as content and function.

[Question] Let's go into free ports and trade zones first, if you will.

[Answer] Free trade zones are areas where international trade is heavy, in which trade is made possible in a climate devoid of a country's internal bureaucratic procedures, in a climate devoid of customs duties; Hong Kong, for example. Free zones and free ports of this kind have been around for a



long time. They usually function as a big warehouse, offering bonded storage, for the area and serve this function for commerce in both raw materials and finished products, and give a boost to the transit trade as well. The main feature distinguishing this kind of free zone from free production zones is that no production activities take place in them except simple processing like packaging.

[Question] What do you think the results might be of establishing this kind of free trade zone in a country like Turkey?

[Answer] To answer this question one must first seek to answer the question of what is the logic behind establishing either a special trade or industrial zone. I think the logic here is to provide an area where special conditions apply that are impossible to obtain elsewhere in the country or in the country as a whole. The first of these conditions for free trade zones is the absence of red tape and customs and the efficient provision of transportation, communications, banking and such services. If there is now an expectation of international trade and, in particular, regional trade that will be concentrating in Turkey, it may be beneficial perhaps to establish such a trade zone in Turkey and it may provide certain benefits as to transit trade as well. If, in fact, it is believed that Turkey will become an entrepot, a commercial center in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean, that it would become an important reexport center, certain benefits could accrue from such an undertaking. But how realistic expectations along these lines are, of course, is a different matter.

[Question] There are claims that if such a free commercial zone were established it would have significant benefits for Turkish industry in allowing cheap import inputs, reducing costs and alleviating the financing burden. Do you think these claims are realistic?

[Answer] I think these claims just conflict with the logic behind establishing a special trade zone. Free trade zones, as I just said, are usually areas where the transit trade and reexport operations are concentrated. The flow of industrial inputs into the country from these zones or the flow of goods from the country into these zones may be very limited, if it takes place at all, and of little significance.

[Question] So would the main benefit, the main advantage to a country that establishes such a free trade zone be in services?

[Answer] Of course there would be foreign exchange earnings in exchange for the services rendered. But examples elsewhere in the world and the intensive competition that various countries are involved in show clearly that it is not at all easy to earn this foreign exchange. It is not as easy as some people think to provide the conditions whereby a free trade zone established in this competitive climate could become attractive for international trade and capital. In addition to the incentives and efficient transportation-communications infrastructure needed to succeed at

this, it is necessary to offer so many concessions that the added value and net foreign exchange earnings left over may be very low. Considering the public expenditures needed to streamline the infrastructure, it is necessary in any case to draw up a very careful account of what such a zone would bring in and what it would take out.

[Question] I would like to ask one more thing before we go on to free industrial zones. Free zones in Western countries are probably primarily of this first type, that is, free ports or trade zones. Is that true?

[Answer] I think so. It is possible even to think of them as the "duty-free shops" we know so well, that is, giant-size duty-free department stores.

[Question] If we may move on to the second type, free production zones, what are their basic characteristics and distinctions?

[Answer] These zones, oriented toward international production, do not go so far back as trade zones. These became widespread in less-developed countries starting in the 1960's owing to the emergence of dynamics that made these nations viable for multinational companies. Multinational companies started thinking in the 1960's about producing certain goods or parts in countries where they could find cheap labor because of rising wages and growing militancy of the working class in their own countries. The ability to divide up production processes owing to technological developments and development of container carriage also contributed to stepping up this "industrial shift." It was possible in this framework to divide up the production processes of specific products and manufacture the parts requiring labor-intensive processing in places where labor was under tight discipline and wages were low. Now, of course, since it would not be easy to provide these conditions throughout the country as a whole, it was thought that zones should be set up where these conditions could be provided alongside the service infrastructure needed for the free trade zone.

[Question] Was there any rivalry, competition, between prospective countries as regards these industrial free zones?

[Answer] Yes, of course. The chief motive in this phenomenon, which started out in the Far East and spread from there to Latin America and finally to Africa, was cheap labor. There were, in addition, certain minimum standards identified by UNIDO, the UN Industrial Development Organization, that had to be met for these zones to attract foreign capital, but intense competition sometimes required concessions beyond these standards. In addition to offering cheap land and buildings, cheap credit and a series of amortization and tax facilities to the foreign capital that would set up in these zones, there can sometimes even be a question of subsidizing wages or subsidizing energy. In other words, there seems to be no limit to the concessions required to attract foreign capital to these zones.

[Question] In that case, if Turkey wanted to get into this, it would be of course have to offer a lot of these concessions, right?



[Answer] One must be fully aware of that from the beginning here. The country attempting to set up an industrial free zone cannot say, "I am going to set my own conditions here; I'll do this, but I won't do that; I'll offer this, but I won't offer that." In other words, it cannot say, "I'll provide the infrastructure, but I won't subsidize wages," because then it would lose the chance to compete with other free zones. Moreover, the facilities provided and the concessions offered must be continuous because this competition is continuous. For example, when wages started going up in Singapore, some multinational firms operating there shifted their activities to Africa.

[Question] I wonder if this example shows that the technology taken into free production zones is basically simple and transportable?

[Answer] It is mainly the labor-intensive parts, the labor-intensive segments of the production process, that are done in the free production and export zones established in the less-developed countries, as we just mentioned. In addition to traditional industrial such as textiles and hides, the labor-intensive segments of the electronic industry take the lead here. For the most part, they are things that can be done by a very simple work process, a simple technology. So, getting back to your question, it is seen that foreign capital does not bring such important technology and so forth to these free zones and, as soon as the conditions change, it may disappear.

[Question] Would it be possible for the foreign capital employed in such a free production zone to use local inputs and contribute to that country's economy?

[Answer] Studies have been conducted which show that the foreign capital employed in free production zones does not buy much of anything as inputs other than energy and labor, that it hardly involves utilization of local inputs as intermediate goods, for example. Since the production done in these zones usually consists of one part of a broader production process, the process naturally calls for the use of many standard parts. Obviously, they could not be obtained from the country where the free zone is located.

[Question] What does the industry set up in these zones have to offer in the way of added value and employment? Or what benefits might accrue to the country that establishes the zone?

[Answer] The industries established in these zones are usually seen to be industries having very low added value. The sums entering and leaving these zones may now sometimes seem huge, being expressed in tens of billions, twenty billions. But the net amount remaining may be very low, sometimes even negative. The logic from the standpoint of foreign capital probably requires that this be the case anyhow. As to employment, the workforce hired in these zones consists primarily of poorly-paid women and children. For this reason, one cannot easily look to these zones as a solution from the employment standpoint.

[Question] Mr Berksoy, adding up all these factors you have considered, how would you assess the establishment of a free trade zone or industrial zone in Turkey and its chances for success?

[Answer] I said to start with that serious consideration might be given the idea of a free trade zone if it was believed that Turkey would have an important function in regional trade. On condition that it be very objective and carefully thought out, of course. There is no question here of any such idea as "let them come and we will work together." It is necessary to bear in mind the serious public expenditures to ready the infrastructure required here, to bear in mind the expenditure of foreign exchange. In addition to infrastructure, it may be necessary to offer very serious concessions to capital that would come for free production zones in particular; it may be necessary to offer large subsidies. Moreover, we are rather advanced in our stage of development and our wages are a little higher than in any Middle Eastern country. Yet we know that what basically attracts foreign capital to this kind of production zone is very cheap labor. To provide this in a free production zone established in Turkey, it would be necessary to create an artificial climate or impose hardships on the rest of the country. I do not think it would be easy to create the conditions that can be created in an African country in a country that has now decided to restore democracy and where labor rights and democracy are traditional.

[Question] If we were to look beyond this at what it would bring and what it would take away...

[Answer] What it would bring. They say it would bring foreign exchange, but I think the net foreign exchange input would be limited. As for employment, it is, as I just said, a matter involving the employment of women and children who will consent to work for very low wages. Meanwhile, we must not forget that employment can also be created by putting the public spending that would go into this into other areas. As for service revenues, the giant companies that come into such a zone have their own banks, their own advertising companies, their own service companies. If they come in, they all come together. Now, what I would like to reiterate here is this: The prerequisite for attracting foreign capital into these zones is to give it everything it wants, and this must be taken into account. When you set out to establish such a zone, you are actually concluding an international contract. If you should then fail or try to dispense with certain conditions, your loss of respect is going to be on an international scale, and that may be grave indeed.

8349

CSO: 3554/136

## MERSIN, ANTALYA PROSPECTIVE FREE PORTS

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 19 Jan 83 p 12

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURİYET BUREAU)--The SPO [State Planning Organization] has prepared a report on the legal revisions needed to establish free zones. The SPO report calls for "free ports" as a short-term solution in that it would "facilitate development of shipping, transit trade and reexport, as well as services involving foreign contracting." It contends that Free Zones Law No 6209 is sufficient for short-term solutions. It states also that, among existing ports, Mersin is adequate for transit shipping and Antalya for contracting requirements and that "these ports may be converted into free ports without the need for excessive investment."

The SPO report says that "by implementing free ports on a narrow scale, Turkey would benefit in very small measure from the potential and advantages it has," and proposes the establishment of free ports on a broad scale. However, the SPO does call for amendment of Free Zones Law No 6209 for the establishment of free zones. The areas in which the law requires amendment, according to the SPO, are:

--"Banking and insurance services must be permitted in free zones. These services are not included in the existing law.

--"In addition to permitting accommodations for local and foreign businessmen conducting business in the free zones and permitting limited residences in the zone, the building of the necessary guest facilities and tourist hotels must be permitted. These are not possible under the present law.

--"Major considerations such as incentives, taxes and social rights of employees to apply in free zones must be reviewed as compared to domestic practices and practices in neighboring countries in particular and must be revised accordingly. Otherwise, there can be no hope for success."

The SPO report also lists the pros and cons of free zones for the national economy. The benefits are listed as follows:

--"Commercial advantages will increase in the port and zone and the zone will become an international business and trade center. Merchants will

enter into an extensive and continuous business relationship with world markets.

--"Importation and exportation will be easier. The country's export materials will be purchased and processed in various ways by large buyers and later sold in small lots to consumer countries.

--"Storage costs will decline as the time element, so important in business, is reduced to a minimum, making cheap importation possible.

--"It will contribute to solving the employment problem.

--"Worker income will comprise an important source of foreign exchange for the country. For example, South Korea received \$14.5 million annually in worker foreign exchange in exchange for a \$16 million investment by the state in the 'Masan' free production zone.

--"Income and corporation taxes will raise the country's public revenues."

#### Objections

The SPO report lists these objections to free ports and measures to counter them:

--"Concern exists over the vulnerability of free ports to smuggling. However, it is preventable through effective oversight and organization.

--"It may be said that the advantages of free zones would place products produced there in competition with local industry when imported into Turkey and this would have a negative effect on local industry. However, just as this may prove beneficial to local industry in raising quality and lowering prices, it must be noted also that it is possible to limit industry in the free zones both as to sector and volume."

8349

CSO: 3554/133

## BOURASSA INTERVIEWED ON CANDIDACY FOR PLQ CHIEF

Quebec LE SOLEIL in French 12 Jan 83 p A-1

[Interview with Robert Bourassa, candidate for the directorship of the Quebec Liberal Party, by special correspondent Jean-Jacques Samson, in Montreal]

[Text] Next May or June Robert Bourassa will meet with his former colleagues who have reportedly also expressed their intention to be candidates for the post of PLQ party leader, in order to try to establish with them a consensus as to the person then in the best position, in the eyes of public opinion, to assume that function.

So he confided yesterday during a long interview at LE SOLEIL.

"I shall continue until May or June to meet with militants and take part in party activities. In May or June I shall see which are interested, and we shall discuss things among ourselves. We shall say to ourselves: who wants to go ahead? who is in the best position to do it? who has the best chance of beating the PQ?

"I would be much surprised if that were followed by a fratricidal struggle which would divide the party," M Bourassa added.

The former prime minister continued that he did not want to comment on the "other candidates," that he knew he was far from having the unanimous backing of the party establishment, but that he did not see who enjoyed the same professional freedom as he did to resume the task of PLQ head. The most recent polls indicate he is the candidate best rated by public opinion, he recalls, and he has the taste for making an extra effort in politics.

M Bourassa indicated he was now restraining his partisans so as not to set off a regular race for the party leadership, and that he still has no organizing committee or campaign strategy.

"One must not waste energy to no purpose," he went on.

The plan for meeting with possible opponents focuses essentially on MM Raymond Garneau and Gerard-D. Levesque. M Bourassa insists that interpersonal relations among the three of them are very sound, and anticipates that the congress on party leadership could well be more of a publicity springboard to give the PLQ new impetus for the next general election, rather than an internal fight.

#### Support From the Base

M Bourassa notes that he has many opponents within the party: the followers of Claude Ryan, a good part of the party establishment, those deputies who take their cue from Ottawa (nearly half the present caucus, he estimates), and finally the federal liberals.

"All that, put together, makes a lot of people. They can perhaps agree on an attempt to stop me, but their problem will be to find the man, the candidate around whom they could form a consensus," says the former prime minister.

M Bourassa will be more present in Quebec in 1983, since he has declined to give courses at American universities. He plans to be absent in February for a lecture tour in Europe.

The former prime minister feels strengthened by a solid popularity rating from regional militants, and leans on that popular support.

Finally, he does not yet wish to "fetter" himself--his word--by officially announcing his candidacy, he says.

#### Not a Candidate in By-Elections

M Bourassa will not run, however, in the next by-elections in Saint-Jacques, Saguenay, and Charlesbourg districts. The need in Saint-Jacques, he says, is for someone from the district who can give full time to his work as a deputy. "Citizens want to see their deputy; one must be very available in the district, and devote two or three days a week to dealing with peoples' problems. I was beaten in 1976 in Mercier because people could not see me enough. They wanted to meet their deputy, not secretaries--and that is normal."

Several local candidates are also on ballots for Charlesbourg and Saguenay, he adds. Those two districts are distant from his home in Montreal.

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CSO: 3619/27



## BOURASSA'S CANDIDACY DISCUSSED

Montreal LA PRESSE in French 14 Jan 83 p A 6

[Editorial by Vincent Prince: "Robert Bourassa's Candidacy"]

[Text] In an interview just given to SOLEIL of Quebec, former prime minister Robert Bourassa said he will wait till "next May or June" to decide whether he will be a candidate to succeed Claude Ryan--in other words, to decide if he will try again to take the lead of the liberal troops.

We are inclined in spite of ourselves to take that declaration with a grain of salt. Indeed, most observers of the provincial scene consider that the man has already been campaigning for several months. He does his utmost to accept every rostrum offered him to recall himself favorably not only to the liberals but to voters as a whole. He strives to show he has plans to solve the problems of the hour which could be in the interest of the people of Quebec.

We wonder, moreover, why he would seek to mask his ambitions. His words betray him. In barely disguised terms, he offers himself as the best possible candidate. And, in any case, he has as much right as anyone to bid for the party leadership.

It will rest with the liberals to decide if his strong points amply outweigh his weak ones. The latter are rather easy to identify. The fact that a man has already sustained defeat for a given post, for example, is surely a handicap at the start. It is also difficult for a party in this way to bring back a former leader to the surface. That risks giving the impression that it is truly poor in worthy candidates.

There are probably also some liberals who did not particularly appreciate Mr Bourassa's insistence in calling on Claude Ryan to open a district for him that he might return to the National Assembly. Such conduct was embarrassing to the new party head. It is possible there are those who recall it with bitterness, and who fear old wounds might be reopened by his return as head of a party which would still have Ryan in its ranks.

It will rest with him and his organizers, on the other hand, to demonstrate that in spite of everything he is surely the man best able to bring them back into power. That is perhaps not impossible to prove.

When Bourassa was defeated in 1976 his personal popularity rating had fallen very low. It must be admitted that his many public addresses since then, particularly during the referendum debate, have allowed him to do wonders in reburnishing his image. He then succeeded in getting himself considered as something of a sage and elder statesman.

That regained popularity has moreover been possible to confirm through polls. Recent opinion surveys have shown the population prefers him to the two other possible candidates.

Finally, he can cite his experience in power. In a difficult situation like the one we now experience, such an asset can surely be considered appreciable. It could be all the more so since Bourassa is recognized as an economist and since present problems are above all economic in nature. In addition, and despite his prior service record, we certainly cannot speak of Bourassa as an oldster, for he is not yet fifty. Many world political leaders are older, and many of them, as for example President Mitterand of France, had known several defeats before commanding recognition.

All that comes down to saying there is nothing to oppose an attempt by Bourassa to return as the head of the liberals. Though he has handicaps to overcome, he has assets he can call on. He has the right to be considered like any other candidate aspiring to the same post. But it is evident he is already campaigning, and he could in all honesty admit it.

6145

CSO: 3619/27



## MAOIST PARTY INCREASINGLY DIVERGES FROM LEFT ON DEFENSE

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 7 Jan 83 p 4

[Article by Anker Schjerning, DKP Central Committee Member]

[Text] Recently a number of peace organizations have joined together to form the National Campaign to Stop Nuclear Missiles, in order to prevent the deployment of 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles in Denmark. A large torchlight procession on 4 December in Copenhagen was arranged by the national campaign.

Almost all organizations affiliated with the peace movement supported this cooperation, but as we know every rule has an exception.

On the day of the demonstration, 4 December, the Communist Workers' Party (KAP) sent out a warning, followed by letters to the editors of INFORMATION and other papers with the following warning: Dear Peace Lovers, be on guard. Do not be led into temptation by DKP (Communist Party of Denmark) and its budding front organizations. No one can accuse KAP of not trying to prevent poor, naive peace lovers from a fate worse than death at the hands of the Joint Committee.

The question is whether or not the peace movement will listen to the warnings of Annette Westrup, Morten Lind, and the others. If we examine their arguments carefully, we find, first of all, superficial empty phrases and, secondly, standpoints that have little in common with the peace movement.

Their analysis of the United States and the Soviet Union is primitive slogan-eering: The superpower desperadoes in Moscow and Washington, the weapon-hungry madmen with their insane logic of balanced destruction are racing toward the precipice. Any thinking supporter of peace can see that reality is considerably more complicated. We find the freeze movement and Reagan's difficulty pushing the MX through the House of Representatives, on the one hand, and the recent Soviet offer to halve the number of nuclear warheads in missiles pointing at Europe, on the other. The Danish peace movement is becoming more and more mature and the phrase-mongers are finding it more and more difficult to make their voices heard.

KAP wants to make the peace movement into a movement for struggle against the superpowers, including the Soviet Union. That is against the very nature of the

peace movement. Working for peace means working to break down antagonisms, trying to see the other side's point of view, listening to the signals coming from the East, and working to convince one's own government to accept the outstretched hand. Thus, the starting point of the peace movement is diametrically opposed to that of KAP which, like NATO, wants to arm Denmark morally and militarily against the threat from the East. This is why KAP is having a difficult time among peace groups, especially since the Soviet Union has demonstrated a willingness to compromise.

In typical bourgeois fashion, KAP letters to newspaper editors self-righteously judge the rest of the world: The evil superpowers want to destroy us poor, innocent Europeans. If you do not share these superficial views, then you obviously are untrustworthy or a flunkey of the superpowers.

This self-righteous manner goes against a good old rule of thumb in the peace movement, which says that you must begin sweeping on your own doorstep. And those of us who live in the Western European NATO countries have much sweeping to do. Do we have any right to complain that Russian missiles are aimed at us if we act as a launching pad for the nuclear weapons of the United States?

KAP presents a NATO-style analysis of the Western European peace movement. A large portion of the antinuclear movement is seen as a creation of the East: simple, naive members of the peace movement are duped by DKP into acting in the interest of the Soviet Union.

This is nonsense through and through. How in heaven's name do they believe that a party with 1.1 percent of the vote can tempt and entice half of Denmark? The truth is that the opposition to nuclear weapons is based on the fundamental national interests of Danes and Europeans. If DKP finds it easy to win support for its peace policies, there is a simple explanation--that these policies are in agreement with Danish national interests.

KAP's positions are indefensible and contrary to the peace movement, although they are certainly in line with bourgeois communist-fear propaganda in Denmark. KAP may spread confusion in those segments of the peace movement that have not yet broken loose from decades of NATO-inspired thinking, but in those sectors of the peace movement that have analyzed the situation in depth, they have no chance of success. The peace movement cannot be united by uncompromising anti-Sovietism.

9336

CSO: 3613/49

## DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIALS DENY GREENLAND BASES ARE THREAT

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 6 Jan 83 p 3

[Article by Alex Frank Larsen]

[Text] Denmark's Defense Ministry never has been briefed on the three large military facilities the United States has installed in Greenland in preparation for nuclear war.

The two responsible officials told INFORMATION that neither the facilities nor their names were known to the ministry.

According to the Danish-American agreement of 1951, both countries must be briefed on all military facilities in Greenland. The United States was unsuccessful in its bid to obtain purely American installations on the island. As a result, both flags must fly over military bases and if one of the countries runs a base or other facility, the other country must be represented by a liaison officer who must be consulted on all matters of importance.

Denmark has liaison officers at the Thule base and in the Sondre Stromfjord military region. There are no reports from these bases of espionage and guidance facilities for nuclear missiles, as discussed in the book "Greenland Pearl of the Mediterranean" according to section chiefs J. Wahl and K. D. Andersen.

The book, which will appear next week, describes three military facilities that the authors claim are not strictly defensive in nature but are to be used in an American counterforce strategy for a surprise attack on Soviet nuclear forces.

The three facilities are located in Thule. They include the Giant Talk and Green Pine communications systems for transmitting attack orders to American bombers en route to the Soviet Union and the spy installation OL-5 which transmits strategic information by satellite from throughout the world.

"This information is new to me and it does not conform to the Danish-American agreement. Our understanding is that these facilities serve a warning function and we assume that this still is the case," said the head of the Defense Ministry's NATO office, J. Wahl.

"Does Denmark have full insight into what goes on at the American bases in Greenland?" Wahl was asked.

"We do not call them American bases, but joint Danish-American defense regions. It is difficult to say whether or not we have full insight. With all the new technology it is extremely difficult to say what each individual gadget can be used for and the stations are being modernized constantly."

"According to the new book, it is not a matter of gadgets, but of large-scale facilities that cannot escape notice. Do the Danish liaison officers have access to all facilities, as stipulated by the 1951 agreement?" he was asked.

"I do not know. That is under the jurisdiction of Office 1."

"Have you ever heard of Giant Talk?"

"Never."

"Or OL-5?"

"No. There may be much technology I do not know about and that may be my fault. In addition, many things can be used for various purposes, so it is impossible to say that military facilities can be used only for certain purposes."

"Has the ministry been briefed?"

"I do not know, but such reports go to Office 1."

"Have there been changes in or additions to the Danish-American agreement of 1951?"

"I do not recall any."

The chief of the Defense Ministry's Office 1, Major K. D. Andersen said his office knew nothing about Giant Talk, Green Pine, or OL-5, which are mentioned in the book.

"Do the Danish liaison officers have complete access to the American bases?" Andersen was asked.

"I do not know if they can enter the commanding officer's bathroom or where else they may go," he said.

"Do you know how these facilities are used?"

"There are liaison officers between the American and Danish authorities, but I do not know where they go," Andersen said.

"Are the three facilities purported to be offensive in nature described in the reports from the Danish officers?"

"I neither can nor will say what these reports contain, but I am not familiar with the systems you are asking about."

"Will you investigate the matter?" he was asked.

"We receive many inquiries from journalists and if we were to investigate all of them we would have time for nothing else," Andersen said.

"According to your information, have there been any changes in the Danish-American agreement or have there been additions to it?"

"There have been no changes in recent years. I have no information on what has occurred since 1951," K. D. Andersen said in conclusion.

The agreement between Denmark and the United States on military facilities in Greenland was approved by parliament on 1 June 1951 with 80 votes in favor of the agreement, while 7 communists voted against it. The Radical Liberal Party and the Single-Tax Party--a total of 13 votes--abstained.

This agreement superseded an original treaty signed by then ambassador Henrik Kauffmann and the United States government during the war. This treaty was approved unanimously by parliament during its first session after the occupation on 16 May 1945.

The new agreement is valid as long as the NATO treaty is in effect, but unlike the Kauffmann agreement, the United States was not granted autonomous American military regions. According to article 13, after a reasonable period of time, both countries can propose revisions in the agreement.

The same day the agreement was approved, parliament also approved the appointment of a commander in chief of the joint defense forces in the Atlantic region (SACLANT). The actual defense of Greenland was handed over to the Danish Greenland Command in Gronnedal.

Since then, the United States and Denmark have negotiated to expand the military facilities. In March 1958 the two governments agreed to establish the DEW System, a line of four radar stations on the inland ice of southern Greenland. Two years later, negotiations led to construction of the powerful BMEWS radar facility in Thule and two LORAN stations in East Greenland to aid air and sea navigation.

9336

CSO: 3613/49

## BOTH GREENLAND MP'S ASK MINISTER BE FIRED

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 9 Jan 83 p 1

[Article by Michael Ehrenreich]

[Text] Both of Greenland's members of parliament, Otto Steenholdt and Preben Lange, are so dissatisfied with the performance of Minister of Greenland Affairs Tom Hoyem that they have demanded his dismissal in no uncertain terms.

At the same time, chairman of the Greenlandic Home Rule Administration Johathan Motzfeldt has proposed that the Ministry of Greenland Affairs be closed and Greenlandic affairs be transferred to the office of the prime minister, according to the Faeroe Islands model.

"I get the impression more and more that the minister is two-faced and I do not trust him any more. He should resign for his own sake, for the sake of the government, and especially for the sake of Greenlanders," said Otto Steenholdt, who pointed out that in the parliamentary EC committee the minister had regretted linking the 12 nautical-mile limits of Great Britain and of Greenland, but that he would "give no guarantee against similar statements in the future."

Otto Steenholdt also is angry at Tom Hoyem for his approval of seal kills in Newfoundland and for his allotment of 200 tons of Greenlandic shrimp to Danish fishermen "without informing the Home Rule Administration."

"We have no use for apprentices in his position. We need experienced people who know Greenland," Otto Steenholdt said.

The other Greenlandic member of parliament, Preben Lange, told Holbaek County's VENSTREBLAD yesterday that Hoyem "has committed one gaffe after another, resulting in a worsening of otherwise good relations between Denmark and Greenland."

At the same time, chairman Jonathan Motzfeldt of the Home Rule Administration is seeking negotiations with the government to close down the Ministry of Greenland Affairs.

"I do not wish to become involved in the battle over Tom Hoyem, but after



4 years of home rule we need a direct line to the prime minister, which the Faeroe Islands have had for many years," Motzfeldt said.

Tom Hoyem was unavailable for comment on the statements of Otto Steenholdt and Jonathan Motzfeldt.

9336

CSO: 3613/49

## NEW WEHRSPORTGRUPPE CONDUCTS EXERCISES

Bonn VORWAERTS in German 6 Jan 83 p 9

[Article by Dirk Gerhard: "Our Flag Is Black-White-Red"]

[Text] A new Wehrsportgruppe [militant sport group] forms while the police and the law sleep.

A new Wehrsportgruppe (WSG), organized along Hoffman's model, is causing people in the Fulda area to talk. The group goes on maneuvers in the vicinity of the Rhoeen and openly deals in nazi propaganda. This does not seem to distress the police or the law.

"Once and for all it must end!", demands the young man in heavy jumpboots and a marine haricut. "...German youth must raise its head and become nationality-conscious and admit: we will not live in the past!" This is what is demanded on his flyer by a muscular guy with a moustache.

This was in downtown Frankfurt on 27 November 1982. The distributors of said flyer wore an hardly disguised "S" rune on a jacket lappel or upper arm. By itself, it is the insignia of national socialist German youth; when it is doubled, this rune becomes the insignia of the security squadron: the "SS".

According to their demands, "Holocaust" propaganda must end as should having to overcome the past. The police saw no reason to intervene: neither because of the flyers nor because of ths "SS" insignia. It was different with the opposition group protesting against the new runway for the Frankfurt Airport; this group distributed flyers depicting the Hessian lion in a police helmet and cudgel. The distributors of "SS" flyers were left unmolested.

The guardians of the law would have had every reason to pay that much more attention to them. Some of the flyer distributions were already known right-wing extremists. One of them was Wolfgang Koch, perhaps 50 years old, known since that notorious conference hall battle in Lentfoehrden in 1978, where he, together with other neo-nazi activists, like Michael Kuehnen of the ANS [Action of the National Socialists], was conducting a ceremony commemorating Hitler. When the police intervened, there was a fight with beer mugs and chair legs.

There was also another Nazi activists who should have been conspicuous to the police: Arndt Heinz Marx, the former strait-laced "Unterfuehrer" of the outlawed "Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann".

That a third flyer distributor is not nationally known is not the fault of the police, but of the law which has yet to bring him to trial. Here we are talking about that muscular guy with the moustache who wore the poorly disguised Nazi insignia on his lappel. His name is Thomas Brehl; according to his insignia, he is "Gruppenfuehrer" of the Fulda "Wehrsportgruppe".

According to some sources, Brehl is the grandnephew of the former Nazi Gauleiter, Rudolf Jordan, with whom he continues to maintain contact. Although Brehl has gone all out to revive nazi ideas, and leaves no stone unturned in order to spread his dreams of a greater Germany, Fulda's law establishment has left him undisturbed.

"We are ready for the ultimate"

The Public Prosecutor's Office with the Fulda District Court saw no reason to legally move against Brehl and his "Wehrsportgruppe" even when the DGB [German Federation of Union] Kreis chairman, Julius Klausmann, brought charges against another member of the Fulda WSG.

As a result of a counter demonstration by the DGB against the June 1982 meeting of the "SS" division, "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", members of the Fulda WSG provocatively passed out flyers with the title: "Das laengst faellige Lied" [The Song Due for Some Time]. Under the direction of the group's "Gruppenfuehrer" ("SS" equivalent for general), the Fulda WSG attempted to disrupt the DGB demonstrators. The Nazi war of plunder is glorified in this song and "our fathers" are presented as "the world's best soldiers" whose deeds were acts of heroism.

Although this song was distributed on the occasion of a meeting of the "Waffen SS" and the WSG itself maintains the "SS" traditions, the Public Prosecutor's Office in Fulda saw no reason for making changes. Even the fact that WSG members bear "SS" titles does not bother any public prosecutor in Fulda. Even the fight song of the WSG--in which the words: "each of us is a warrior for the Reich, and we are ready for the ultimate", and, "our flag is black-white-red"--has still to have legal consequences.

The activities of teh WSG are becoming more and more bold. If Brehl and his gang were once content to limit their activities to setting up jointly with the "Viking Youth" warning guardposts on the border to the GDR on New Year's eve, or to participating in a tent city of the young national democrats also in the vicinity of the border, then their activities have been stepped up in recent years.

After former BSG member Brehl's personnel had gone out for years on combat maneuvers in the vicinity of the Rhoen, they were now going out reenforced onto the street looking for political agitation and provocation.

- WSG members threatened a student early in 1981 for selling a leftist weekly newspaper with the words: "The German race must not perish, and whoever stands up for foreign subhumans must be annihilated."

- WSG members distributed a "German Monthly Dispatch" in front of the Freiherr-von-Stein Gymnasium in February 1982. This "dispatch" called upon the people to "boycott all Turkish businesses, people and culture".

- A flyer with the heading "Regarding the Holocaust" was distributed in April 1982. It contained an excerpt from the periodical, "Weltbund des Voelkischen" [World Federation of the Racially Conscious]. Eberhard Engelhardt, a lawyer from Nurnberg, is responsible for the drawing. The mass murder of the Jews is characterized as "...the most macabre fraud of all time" in the flyer.

But Fulda's WSG has not limited itself to only the distribution of flyers. It tried to provoke a meeting of the Fulda youth union in May 1982 by turning the discussion to the problem of the "foreigners".

Although the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office in Frankfurt has known for months that "Gruppenfuehrer" Brehl is spreading Nazi propaganda material as well as the propaganda of outlawed organizations like the VSBD (Volkssozialistische Bewegung Deutschlands [People's Socialist Movement of Germany]), it has had until now no effect on the group. The WSG commemorated the "murdered (Nazi) government of the Reich" in a wreath-laying ceremony in October 1982 and was not disturbed in this action. They met with members of other neo-Nazi groups for this event in Frankfurt's central train station.

The police in Fulda are currently making a great effort to determine who laid a wreath at the city's war memorial; on the wreath's striped ribbon someone had written the words: "Grass does not grow over gallows. Nurnberg, 16 October 1982. Purim Festival". How does the "Gruppenfuehrer" Thomas Brehl say it? "Heil Deutschland!"

12247

CSO: 3620/196

## RADICAL RIGHTISTS DISCUSS FOUNDING NEW NAZI PARTY

West Berlin DIE TAGESZEITUNG in German 18 Jan 83 p 4

[Article: "Neo-Nazis Are Reorganizing"]

[Text] The released former "Fuehrer" of the "Aktionsfront Nationale Sozialisten", [Action Front of National Socialists], ANS, Michael Kuehnen, and the head of the new Frankfurt based rightwing extremist organization "Kameradschaft Nationaler Aktivisten" [Comrades of National Activists], (KNA), Arndt Heinz Marx, met at a "working dinner" in a Frankfurt Wienerwald restaurant with numerous "followers". Kuehnen seems to want to clarify to his Frankfurt "comrades" with this visit exactly what he announced on a West German television show on 12 January: the gathering of splintered rightwing extremists and the founding of an NSDAP [Nazi] successor party.

No, Michael Kuehnen is not the new "Fuehrer". This is what he let the WDR reporter on the same show understand. The term "Fuehrer" is a rather "holy" concept for him to claim for himself. However, according to Kuehnen literally: "a time can come when we have to take on tasks meant for a 'Fuehrer'". He was allowed on Saturday in Frankfurt-Niederrad to convince the Southern Hessian neo-Nazi group, "KNA", around the experienced young nazis Marx (Frankfurt) and Brehl (Fulda) of his "leadership qualities". Kuehnen spoke with the police; Kuehnen held his "young hotheads" in check and the brown "bar matadors", Marx and Brehl, stayed in the background.

Arndt Heinz Marx himself is therewith no blank page. If at the end of the 1970's he was first a member of the "young national democrats", Marx changed over in 1979 to Hoffmann's "Wehrsportgruppe" [military sport group] and disappeared to Lebanon after its prohibition, probably together with Hoffmann. Already before Hoffmann, the printer apprentice Marx had contact with the "Fuehrer" of the "Battle Group of Greater Germany", Frank Schubert. Marx was a "Sturmuehrer" in Hoffmann's organization in the "Rhine-Main area of operation" and trained among others, youngsters like Stefan Wagner, who in August 1982 left the "movement" with a spectacular suicide. His "comrade", Thomas Brehl, (My Model is the German Soldier of World War II) [In Stalingrad or in a French Bordello?] comes

like Marx from the "prep school of the young national democrats" (WDR). He organized small attacks against cemeteries with a firm group and was-- according to some sources--"inactive" for the last year, until he met Marx who was at the "same level" with him: "Eventually the prattle of the NPD becomes too limp".

The "KNA" which was founded last fall, consists of about 30 youthful right-wing extremists (17 to 25 years), who were already conspicuous in the weeks just before Christmas. "KNA" members had distributed flyers against the TV showing of "Holocaust" at the Hauptwache subway station in downtown Frankfurt, and had agitated against foreign fellow citizens. At the same time, the police had moved against a Jewish citizen who had become angered by the Nazi appearance--black clothing, belts, SS styled insignia and hobnail boots. The neo-Nazis remained in the meantime unmolested by the police.

Similarly, Anti-fascists organized a meeting last Saturday at the Weinerwald restaurant in order to protest the Nazi provocation. Even the owner of the restaurant was angered by his uniformed patrons; he had thought that it was to have been a class reunion. Nevertheless, the neo-Nazis attempted to go through with their "working dinner" in a back room. Police units intervened only when another patron was molested by a "KNA" member and then threatened. In the meantime, a group of neo-Nazis had moved against a photographer who had wanted to take pictures in the back room. Michael Kuehnen himself held his people back: "we do not need a confrontation with the police during this phase of the rebuilding". Kuehnen negotiated with the leader of the police units and was granted "a free withdrawal with police protection". With their very long wooden canes, SS insignia on their fanciful uniforms and belt buckles they were allowed to get into their cars and drive away. There was no identity check; nor were those previously fined fascists subjected to an identity check. Only the young Nazi who had threatened the restaurant patron was taken away in a police car for an identity check.

12247

CSO: 3620/196



## MORLOK ATTACKS CDU ALIEN POLICY IN LOWER SAXONY CAMPAIGN

Fankfurt/Main FEANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 24 Jan 83 p 4

[Text] Six weeks before the Federal elections, the FDP [Liberal Democratic Party] is feeling a gentle up-wind, according to its deputy Federal chairman Morlok. However, Morlok does not yet feel assured of either the parliamentary survival of his party, which fell into a state of crisis because of its change of coalition in Bonn, nor of the continuance of the power of political liberalism in the German Federal Republic. The possibility that the two big parties could win an absolute majority on March 6 seems appears as much more of a "real danger" to Morlok. Morlok reminded the FDP, which was selecting its state candidates' list this weekend, that now more than ever, the Liberals must warn the voters of this.

Democracy, said Morlok, would become hopelessly stunned if the political field were to be occupied solely by the "Blacks", the "Reds" or a "mixture with the Greens": in the case of an absolute majority of the Union, the CSU [Christian Social Union] would dominate, which must be prevented "for the sake of the constitutional State". An absolute majority of the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] or of one of the Green-tolerated SPD-regencies would likewise be dangerous, because both are incapable of effectively controlling unemployment. The Greens could not take up the FDP's function as an engine of social reform and a guarantee of political continuity; they have themselves declared that they are incapable of compromise and unwilling to form coalitions and they have no conception of how to solve the most important political problems.

Morlok attacked Interior Minister Zimmermann's (CSU) foreigner policy, associated with the reproach that if the big parties kept Liberalism at all, it would be in a "poison cabinet". The FDP is certainly pleading for an end to the further enlistment of foreign workers and for the facilitation of voluntary return of foreign workers to their home countries. The Party, however, refuses to decide to still just allow children of those workers, up to the age of six full years, to immigrate to their parents living in West Germany. According to Morlok, the preservation of families applies to all persons living here and civil rights may not be limited to those holding German citizenship. Otherwise, a policy of

"double standards" would be pursued, he said, with growing anger. He meant exactly that such a policy consists of "us accusing the East if they make it difficult for families to unite, while we ourselves do not allow the children of foreign workers to join their parents".

As in 1980, the Lower Saxony FDP's leading candidate for the Bundestag elections is the Hannover lawyer and notary, Kleinert, already a Bundestag member since 1969 and for just as long, has led his factions workgroup on "Domestic policy and law". At the drawing up of the state candidate list this weekend in Hannover, the fifty-year-old politician was again chosen to head the list in a gathering of state delegates: with the votes tallied at 229-54, 10 abstaining. Equally uncontested as Kleinert, Wolfgramm (Gottingen), the faction's parliamentary manager in the Bundestag since 1974, was elected to second place on the state list. Bundestag representative Bredehorn (Oldenburg-Ammerland) came in third place. Bundestag representative Neuhausen won over Bundestag representative Erke Noth and Landtag [state diet] representative Rau. Bundestag representative Timm came in fifth place on the list.

12261

CSO: 3620/192

## COAL GASIFICATION, LIQUEFACTION UNPROFITABLE

Bonn DIE WELT in German 14 Jan 83 p 9

[Text] The somewhat high expectations that were placed on coal enrichment have now dampened a great deal by science. The Power Economics Institute at Cologne University has just proven in a just-published survey that "despite the spasmodic rise in oil and natural gas prices, large-scale coal gasification and liquefaction plants are far from being economical, for the reason that imported coal in West Germany is relatively low-priced".

In the study "Analysis of the Economy of Advanced Coal Enrichment Processes", Josef F. Ciesiolka and Dieter Schmitt come to the conclusion that "considerable political flank defenses" would be needed if the initiated research and development work in coal enrichment is to be continued, for reasons not the least of which is that the dimension of risk associated with the construction of large installations "might plainly break its bounds [of construction], which is accountable in view of the undertaking".

The authors also do away with the frequently-heard thesis of the economic superiority of coal gasification to liquefaction. Merely for methanol production in smaller plants are the economic prospects somewhat more favorable under certain preconditions.

The economy analysis was based on six large-scale installations (having yearly coal input of between four and five million tons). The subsidy requirements are figured at between 4 and 6.5 billion marks per installation.

12261

CSO: 3620/192

## RALF DAHRENDORF'S RETURN TO FDP POLITICS REVIEWED

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 7 Jan 83 pp 17-18

[Article by Armin Mahler: "Dahrendorf Offers Himself to FDP for Post-Genscher Era"]

[Text] He is used to being right and to being proven right in the end. And yet, Ralf Dahrendorf could not help but point out this self-evident truth during his political comeback after the FDP's Dreikoenige [Three Kinds] convention in Stuttgart. But sometimes--he is adding somewhat flirtatiously --"one would prefer not to be right."

Prospects that this might happen are slim. Despite his party's, i.e., the FDP's, calculated optimism, Dahrendorf believes the probability is small that the liberals will enter the next Bundestag: "It takes voters some time to digest changes." But Dahrendorf wouldn't be Dahrendorf without adding that this was actually something "unspeakable". No, he is not suffering from a lack of self-confidence and a sense of mission.

Still, why should the professor of sociology hide his light under a bushel? Hadn't the FDP called him home in order to instill in his party new hope at a time when it found itself in probably the most catastrophic situation of its undoubtedly turbulent history--he who heads the prestigious London School of Economics (LSE) in far away London? And hadn't the delegates to the Dreikoenige convention been only too willing to follow their old repolished star?

There is no question: The prophet has regained his honor in his own country. Yet, those will be disappointed who expect a repetition of the miracle Dahrendorf began to work on at the very same Dreikoenige convention exactly 15 years ago. At that time, the vertical takeoff in politics which the popular sociologist managed to accomplish was followed by a leap into the Landtag, and one year later into the Bundestag.

Subsequently he became a member of the FDP's federal executive body, and under Walter Scheel, moved into the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs as State Secretary. But nothing was able to hold him for very long. Following a dispute over Ostpolitik, Scheel pushed the difficult individualist on to the Commission of the European Community in Brussels.

"This is not happening anymore," Dahrendorf is reassuring them today, while emphasizing that he is quite happy with what he is doing at the moment.

And that is quite a lot. The FDP chose him to head the Friedrich Naumann Foundation; in London, he continues to direct the LSE and, in addition, is coaching the British on "know thyself" issues in a five-part television series. ("The BBC planning staff has prescribed a daily dose of Dr Dahrendorf," The /Daily Telegraph/ is mocking him.) He attended the most recent sociologists convention, and his new book, whose title has a symbolic ring for him as well as for the FDP--/The Chances of Crisis-, will be published shortly. No, Dahrendorf insists, "I really have no ambition to land a prestigious political appointment."

Nevertheless, that he is not suited to be an /eminence grise/ [power behind the throne], the now-53-year-old Dahrendorf said already 15 years ago, like so many other things--and he loves to say it again and again. And without being asked, he brings up another of his old claims, namely, that he also would be unsuitable to being Number Two. Not much else is left. At any rate, he is not repeating his old demand for the federal chancellorship, a demand--he insists--he never made in the first place.

Dahrendorf's denials notwithstanding, rumors persist that the professor's hour could come if the much-cited liberal deathbell should indeed be tolling on March 6th. His thesis (/Wirtschaftswoche/ 29/1982) that the FDP would have to transform itself from a party of tactics into one of programs, would then win the support of an even larger number of followers--as would his view that this could not be accomplished with Genscher, the current party chief. Whom Dahrendorf considers to be qualified, he isn't saying. Those who know him, know anyway.

He is still confident of his ability to attract voters as he did in 1968 when, while crisscrossing the land in his white Mercedes Cabrio, he won 27 percent of the primary votes in Stuttgart. Or like a year later, at Constance, when he explained his socio-political theories to a rural population and pleaded for their sympathy with the student movement--and still got more than 20 percent of the votes. And all this took place while the anglophile, always dressed in the finest cloth, was keeping his distance and staying away from any physical closeness with the crowds. To him, election successes are "a matter of political style"--of his style, to be sure: "what people can't stand is empty talk."

Thus, he expects difficulties in an entirely different area: "The problem is one of keeping the organization together." Not an easy task in a party which, the professor believes, lost some of its most outstanding minds after the change in Bonn (Everyone of them is a loss"), which must overcome the "dearth of original thinking resulting from long years of governing," and which is in such a precarious position primarily "because many don't know what the party stands for."

What it should stand for, that's what the liberal ideologist impressed upon the delegates at the Dreikoenige convention: a brand of liberalism "which, as a productive ferment, dissolves calcified relationships." While, in his opinion, the two big parties are focusing on the growth and employment problems of the past, which are considered historically outdated, Dahrendorf wants the liberals to look toward the future.

The professor does not have any easy answers for today's problems because he does not harmless chaos of changing governments, they have an economy that functions halfway in the dark and halfway in the light."

This is not meant to be taken seriously, just like his thesis that the underground economy [Schattenwirtschaft] is an accomplishment of the liberals. However, moonlighting is proof to him that "the individual knows better than the authorities how one can improve one's prospects for a better life."

What Dahrendorf promises is nothing less than the "kingdom of freedom," in which heteronomous work is being substituted by autonomous activity, a society which economically and sociologically is based on the initiative of the individual: "In the end, the state is always the second-best solution."

These thoughts are not new; the only thing is that nobody in the established parties has expressed them aloud. That the workforce is running out of jobs, that an underground economy and decentralization are unable to create a social network--these, of course, are assertions the Greens are also making. However, Dahrendorf does not believe that they can do what he claims for himself: to create a bridge between a decentralized dual economy (with its strongly informal sector) and a reform of the world's shattered monetary system.

The delegates to the Dreikoenige convention in Stuttgart welcomed these ideas with bursts of applause--delegates who, at the very same convention, toppled Genscher critics in the party from the land roster of candidates. And Martin Gruener, state secretary in Otto Lambsdorf's Federal Ministry of Economics, seems to be very much taken with Dahrendorf and his speech.

Anyhow, whether Dahrendorf's mental exercises can also be put into action by the changed FDP when it is a question of translating his abstract theories into current solutions (Dahrendorf: "I can also do it differently"), that--the professor admits--he doesn't know either. And he is repeating it twice: "I don't know, I don't know."

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## PACIFIST, NEUTRALIST GOALS DOMINATE GREENS' CAMPAIGN

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 10 Feb 83 p 5

[Article by "R. M.": "Green Election Campaign in the Palatinate--Not Much of an Echo for Exotic Peace Activists"]

[Text] Kaiserslautern, early February--The crowd of visitors in the Protestant parish building "Alte Eintracht" [Old Concord] in Kaiserslautern, Palatinate, is not an overwhelming one. In cooperation with the local Protestant youth group, the Greens have issued invitations to an evening event under the apocalyptic title "Warning Against the Third World War." Though the fact that all this has a lot to do with the election campaign is not mentioned explicitly in the program, it goes without saying in light of the proximity of the election date. Moreover, something of a double election battle is taking place in this area, for 6 March is not only the date for electing a new Bonn Bundestag but also the time for electing a new Rhineland-Palatinate Land parliament. Despite all this, however, one cannot speak of a Green mass mobilization in the "Alte Eintracht" this evening. Perhaps 70 or 80 people finally assembled in the medium-size hall. With very few exceptions, they are young people dressed in informal jeans and sweaters. As a warmup, a peace song is sung to guitar accompaniment, but the audience supports the snappy singer with only very subdued humming.

## Exotic Support

The advertised "warning against the third world war" then turns out to be primarily a promotion for solidarity with a peace and liberation movement in the faraway South Pacific apparently previously unfamiliar to most of those present. As representatives of this movement, exotic in every sense of the word, a couple of young men are introduced. One comes from Pelew (or Palau) in Micronesia, and the other wants to be known as an emissary of the Australian aborigines. Whether the two Pacific and antinuclear activists are supported by any official mandate remains entirely unclear, however, and apparently their Green hosts don't really care all that much. The dark-skinned Micronesian and his Australian counterpart, who looks far more like an Englishman or Irishman than like an Australian aborigine, in any case are familiar with their roles; both have been active in the United States and in Japan, and after their appearances in the Federal Republic they will be traveling to various other European countries in the service of the international peace movement.

The man from Pelew, with the help of slides, reports about his South seas island inhabited by not quite 15,000 people. His grandparents, he says, still spoke German since the island at one time before World War I had been colonized and ruled by the Germans. He talks about the intensive effort of the big powers to utilize the farflung insular world in the Pacific as a test area for nuclear tests and missile target terrain. Not only was this damaging the people's health but, in addition, their natural resources of food were in serious jeopardy--in fact had already been partly destroyed. The accusation is directed primarily against the United States, which he says is only very reluctantly prepared to acknowledge the right of self-determination of the islands administered by it. But the other nuclear powers are not being entirely spared by this criticism either; there is even mentioned somewhere of the "Chinese militarists," who also are said to be using the South Pacific as a playground for their nuclear tests.

The speaker of the Greens concludes from the lecture that the struggle against nuclear energy (regardless of whether it is used for military or for civilian purposes) must be waged worldwide. It was not permissible to concentrate exclusively on eliminating the nuclear weapons in Europe, and it was utterly wrong, as an alternative to the planned stationing of new NATO missiles on the West European continent, to accept a transfer of these weapons to ships, because this would only shift the risk to defenseless islanders, such as in the South seas. To follow this trend of thought completely is just as difficult as to make head or tail of the succeeding film about the Australian aborigines, in which there is no trace of any more or less concrete connection with the peace movement, let alone with the alledgedly threatening "third world war."

More to the point of the event are the remarks by 75-year-old Gustine Johansen, a member of the Federal executive of the Greens who has come from Hamburg to the Palatinate to report to the audience on her visit to Hiroshima. There is no doubt but that this simple old woman is truly imbued with a belief in the pacifist ideal of a world without arms. Her vivid descriptions of the horrible destruction wrought by the Hiroshima bomb are bound to give food for thought to skeptical listeners as well, despite the fact that the invocations about an allegedly inescapable apocalyptic catastrophe connected with them if nuclear armament is not abolished forthwith impress one as somehow sectarian and eccentric with their absolute lack of differentiation. Then, after a young churchman in an intellectually much too highflying lecture holds forth about the same complex of questions from the theological point of view, someone from the audience finally calls for a practical protest action against the pending military maneuvers in the town. But by this late hour, the size of the audience has shrunk to only a small number of persons, and it is decided to handle the matter another day.

#### Not Much of an Echo

The Greens are evidently having a hard time with their pacifist and antinuclear postulates in the Rhineland-Palatinate area--something which is definitely being conceded in conversation with the leading people. And yet precisely in Kaiserslautern and environs there is no lack of all kinds of concrete targets for such campaigns. The old town in the Palatinate Forest with its roughly

100,000 inhabitants is among the largest garrisons of U.S. forces in Europe. In the outer districts of the town one encounters giant residential developments for U.S. and French soldiers, with thousands of military vehicles parked behind kilometer-long fences, and farther inside the woods, according to information of the Green activists, there are said to be various kinds of nuclear missile installations. But, contrary to the wishes of the Green ecology and pacifist movement, the great majority of the indigenous population does not appear to be irritated in any way, let alone aroused to protest, by all this. On the contrary, restiveness and concern make themselves known whenever there is talk of plans about a possible transfer or reduction of the garrison. The Greens explain this reaction by pointing to the intensive economic dependence of the region on the presences of the foreign troops.

Roland Vogt, who heads the list of Green candidates in the Rhineland-Palatinate for the pending Bundestag election, is something of an early Green, having participated in founding the new political Alternative movement when it first organized nationwide for the Europe elections in 1979. In his early forties, Vogt cuts a striking figure with his black beard, impressing one as the kind of combination of professional politician and idealistic Alternative apostle which has by now become quite typical of the leadership of the Greens. Unlike Petra Kelly, for instance, the now probably best known figurehead of the movement, Vogt is no gushing orator, his entire appearance being oriented more toward pensive deliberativeness—which, however, does not rule out naive inclinations by any means. After various entangled starts, Vogt studied law, writing his dissertation about the social resistance in Czechoslovakia after the invasion of the Warsaw Pact forces in 1968. It is the so-called social resistance that the Greens have recognized as a concrete alternative to traditional military defense (the sobering experience with this method precisely in Czechoslovakia not having shaken them in this belief).

Among the Greens, Vogt, who for a time was a member of the SPD, has been committed particularly actively to combining the ecology and peace movements—a tie which now has become very close. In contrast with many a Green party colleague, he is not indifferent toward drawing a line between the movement and doctrinaire Marxists and fellow travelers beholden to Moscow. This distance from totalitarian Eastern society patterns, however, has not stood in the way of his letting himself be invited last summer, together with other Alternatives, to an audience of unclear purposes with Libyan dictator and protector of terrorism Qadhafi. This enterprise, financed with Libyan funds, was later criticized severely also among the Greens as an unworthy "pilgrimage," apparently seriously jeopardizing Vogt's career as a Green leader for a time. If the ecology and pacifist party manages to jump the crucial 5-percent hurdle on 6 March, Vogt, heading the Rhineland-Palatinate Land list, is bound to become a Bundestag deputy. In such a case, however, the situation being what it is, he will have to be content with only part of the privileges due to a member of parliament: according to the formally resolved "rotation principle" of the Greens, he would have to cede his Bundestag seat to an assistant in 2 years, and by far the greater part of his deputy's salary will have to be channeled to the party, or a so-called ecology fund.

## Election Platform

What do the Greens want to accomplish in the Bundestag? This question is being answered in accordance with extremely varied ideas and priorities within the heterogeneous movement, which stands out far more by its checkered character than by the uniform green seen on the posters. If one sticks to the election platform, the pacifist and neutralist objectives are clearly in the foreground. The first item of the platform reads "Prevent NATO counterarming." There follows a demand for unilateral disarming in the West, which the Greens believe would open the way for worldwide and complete disarmament. The third item says that the Greens plan to support a "policy of freedom from blocks" in the Bundestag--without any elaboration. Additional items of the platform are the dropping of nuclear energy, massive strengthening of environmental protection, creation of jobs by promoting "alternative, ecological and self-administered enterprises" and expansion of "democracy at the base" though decentralization of government and economic power.

Admittedly such a list of slogans abridges a great deal of what the Greens in part also perceive in a more differentiated manner. A number of their arguments, notably in the ecological and partly also in the economic sphere, cannot simply be dismissed as unrealistic dreaming, with the call for becoming conscious of the limits of industrial growth or of the worldwide armament race meeting with understanding far beyond the narrower circle of the Greens. But the most questionable aspects of the Alternative political movement are primarily the claim of absolute validity of their generally still diffuse prescriptions for salvation and their at least limited readiness to recognize the ground rules of parliamentary democracy and to accept majority decisions--for example, in the case of the possibly imminent stationing of missiles. As yet, however, the Green movement is in a process of acute internal fermentation, with nobody being able to predict today whether it will develop into a lasting force which could ever significantly affect the political life of the Federal Republic.

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## DIVERGENCES FROM CDU POLICY SEEN IN CSU ELECTION PROGRAM

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 8 Feb 83 p 5

[Report by "Gae": "CSU Election Offensive in Bavaria--Meeting of Party Committee"]

[Text] Munich, 5 February--The last party to do so, the CSU has now officially passed its election platform, thus setting the switches of an "offensive, and not defensive" election campaign, to be conducted in such a way as to make it impossible to govern without or against the CDU/CSU. The election platform, unanimously approved without discussion by the delegates of the party committee in Munich, is virtually identical with that of the CDU, which is said to have adopted the wishes of the Bavarian sister party "to a large extent." Minor differences concern, for example, the handling of the Germany question in the schools, a development policy oriented toward German interests and fine points in assessing the work of the SPD-FDP government. Whereas the CDU speaks one-sidedly of Schmidt, the CSU stresses the "Schmidt-Genscher" coalition.

## Strauss Opposed to Second-Vote Gifts

A speech by Strauss, extending over more than 2 hours, revealed, however, that apart from attacks against Lambsdorff and Engelhard he is treating the FDP somewhat more gently again. Though definitely opposing the conceding of second votes, he said there was no plan to campaign against the Liberals. Conceding them a "definite chance," Strauss said the FDP had to establish its identity itself. On the other hand, the CSU launched an out-and-out attack against candidate for chancellor Vogel. Strauss described him as not qualified for the post of chancellor, calling him a decidedly mediocre philistine whom the media were doing their outmost to present as a statesman. An "opportunistic bird of paradise and of passage" he had become more or less an exponent of the SPD leftwing. Secretary General Stoiber presented the delegates with a list of unsolved questions concerning an alleged connection between the former chief mayor of Munich and the "Neue Heimat" corruption scandal.

Strauss in his speech, which only occasionally became mordant, had set himself the aim to supply his people with numerous arguments for the "most important election campaign since 1949," saying: "We must see to it that our arguments have a telling effect." There were two things the SPD had never been able to absorb: a social market economy and membership in NATO. In its alliance with



the SPD, the FDP had been unable notably to mitigate the trend toward socialism. And at this very time, during the so far biggest economic crisis in the Federal Republic, the SPD was showing its socialist orientation more than ever before. The Social Democrats, however, could win the election only if they managed to keep the truth from the people. The CDU/CSU, for instance, would now have to make it clear that it was the Schmidt government that in the 1975-1982 period made social curtailments to the tune of DM 225 billion. The unemployed of today were the unemployed of Schmidt.

#### "Master Workman of Andropov's Trap"

The final part of his election campaign seminar for the 250 delegates, Strauss devoted to the charge of "missile party"--a term he said had been invented by Schmidt as far back as 1958. Vogel was making himself the "master workman of Andropov's trap" if he now thought that the West did not need to do anything any more as long as the Kremlin reduced its potential somewhat. The "zero solution" was an ideal solution, but it was valid only if there was agreement in interpretation and implementation. In fact, however, two different "zero solutions" were opposing one another--a Western and an Eastern one, paper missiles as opposed to steel and nuclear missiles. If the Soviets were not prepared to accept the Western zero solution, it was necessary to take counter-measures.

If this was not done--and the SPD did not want it to happen--the Europeans would become increasingly subject to embezzlement after 1985, with Europe and the United States becoming incurably alienated. This, however, was the first step on the way to de facto neutralization, with all the negative consequences this entailed for NATO. NATO, in turn, Strauss emphasized in taking up an old idea again, also represents protection against the United States, for it does make a difference whether Europe--and particularly the Federal Republic--is treated as pact territory or as neutral territory by U.S. strategy. And therefore, Strauss told his listeners solemnly, the Social Democrats--those "well poisoners of the transatlantic alliance"--must not come to power again in the foreseeable future; "may God protect the German people from falling once more into the hands of those mountebanks!"

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## CDU CAMPAIGN MARRED BY ECONOMIC MEASURES, SPD HAMBURG VICTORY

Vienna PROFIL in German 24 Jan 83 pp 31-34

[Article by Werner A. Perger, Bonn: "False Start--To the Dismay of its Friends, the CDU Appears Nervous at the Start of the Election Campaign"]

[Text] It is already evident that the present election campaign won't be as boring as the last one. CDU Secretary General Heiner Geissler insults the Social Democrats with the German nationalist vocabulary of the 1930's ("political criminals"), and the Social Democrats fight back with a campaign which is gradually caricaturing Helmut Kohl as the "missile chancellor."

True, the latest opinion polls still show the CDU/CSU out in front; one institute (the Elections Research Group in Mannheim) even gives it an edge of more than 50 percent. Allensbach and Infratest polls gave it about 49 percent. But two others, Emnid and Infas, determined that neither of the two big parties will obtain an absolute majority of votes. A joint absolute SPD/Greens majority in the Bundestag therefore remains a possibility.

But Kohl and his partisans might as well relax; that remains the most unlikely of election results. The boss man certainly remains impassive; his thick skin protects him from nervous upsets. But the political community in Bonn and the rest of the FRG is all the more amazed at the Union's nervous election campaign start. All are in agreement about it: a false start.

The reason for this: the shock of the Hamburg results. It continues to shake up the CDU election campaign managers. Last December 19 the SPD had won the election there with a surprisingly wide margin (see PROFIL 1/83). The CDU and SPD may be well aware that a mathematical extrapolation of the Hamburg results shows a clear absolute majority for the CDU in the Bundestag. Says Vogel about those comrades who even consider an SPD election victory as a possibility: "They have overestimated the significance of Hamburg."

But even in the year of the computer human factors still determine matters in actual practice; a political reversal is followed by a psychological low: it lies only a short distance from alarm or even panic. That was why at the start of the new year CDU Secretary General Heiner Geissler personally established a super command post. Acting by himself, he attacked the SPD with a vehemence which dumfounded even his friends. At a regional conference in Ludwigshafen

he inveighed against what he calls the SPD's "rent lie" and quoted poor old Bert Brecht, who would never have dreamt that such a thing could happen in the old days ("He who doesn't know the truth is merely stupid. He who knows the truth and calls it a lie is a criminal"), and subsequently challenged all "decent Germans" to put some distance between themselves and the SPD.\*

Geissler's excesses had one particular objective: they were intended to counteract growing anger within his own party over the Hamburg disappointment and over the spineless way the new chancellor party was dealing with its political adversary. They were intended also to deflect attention from the Union's main spot of vulnerability which, after Hamburg, could also become a problem on 6 March: the Union government's economy measures appear to have exceeded the population's tolerance level. Social programs which benefit low-income groups (e.g., student grants) were cut out; tenants' rights were changed to benefit landlords even more than before; taxes were increased asymmetrically. To top it all, the high-income groups ("the rich") were hit with only a "mandatory loan" rather than with a "supplementary tax"--in other words a super tax which is to be reimbursable after the middle of the 1980's. The SPD's justification: "You take from the little people; you borrow from the rich."

Certainly the Kohl-Genscher government wanted to do only what is right from its own point of view, like any other government: stimulate the economy and create jobs. However, in doing so it followed Reagan's, Thatcher's and Lambsdorff's way all too obviously. Social justice, a top election issue in Hamburg, thus became the ace (apart from the missile problem) in the card game of the new opposition.

Apart from Geissler's verbal fireworks, the Union (CDU and CSU together) reacted substantially to that danger on its social flanks last weekend: it sweetened the pot a bit. In their joint election platform, both parties announced that the so-called "mandatory loan" from higher-income groups and the self-employed would not be reimbursed after all, despite the decision made in coalition with the FDP 4 weeks ago. The "supplementary tax," one of the main reasons for the downfall of the SPD/FDP alliance, was thus resurrected as a CDU/CSU project.

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\* Geissler referred to the SPD campaign against the Bonn tenants' laws. An increase in Hamburg's welfare rents, effective on New Year's Day, had the effect during the election campaign of being a result of the change of course in Bonn, to the detriment of the CDU, even though it had been decided upon by the SPD in the Hamburg Senat.

Calling SPD voters, even party members, "indecent Germans"? The SPD leadership "political criminals"? Geissler did not of course say so in so many words, but he certainly suggested it. That was the way it was understood, however, and the SPD wants it to remain understood that way. It counts on a boomerang effect from this on the CDU. It is distributing campaign buttons which read, defiantly and ironically: "I am an indecent German" and the party's weekly VORWAERTS last week started an interview with Willy Brandt as follows: "How do you feel, Herr Brandt, as the chief of a band of criminals?" Answered Brandt: "Fine, thank you."

The chancellor's party could count with certainty on the socialists' ridicule. the neo-conservative "liberals" of the FDP were totally embarrassed. Their first reaction: speechlessness from consternation, and outrage. The Count was the first to regain his composure. As he had done long ago during the social-liberal autumn, Lambsdorff reassured the imaginary clientele of his party--lawyers, dentists, brokers, executives (common denominator: DM 100,000 per year and over): "We won't be any part of this." Let alone the friends in the media--they scolded and despaired: We never expected anything like this--how could such a thing happen? This was supposed to be a "change of course?" The FDP conservatives could hardly comprehend that the CDU, and even the CSU, would so quickly give in to the SPD's agitation and pressure. Said Vogel: "We are determining policy, even before we are in office."

In the headline of last Tuesday's commentary, the industry-friendly HANDELS-BLATT summarized the catastrophe: "The SPD Calls the Tune." The article itself documents the disappointment and sinister foreboding, quite exaggerated on both counts, but typical for the Kohl party's dilemma in this 1983 election campaign. An excerpt: "For more than a decade the Union has fought against social-liberal policy as a socialist aberration; now, having finally acceded to power, it is itself taking over the essential elements of that policy. It is questionable whether March will turn into a celebration of a Kohl month."

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## LEROY LADURIE ON PCF INFLUENCE ON MEDIA, RESEARCH, ECONOMY

Paris LE FIGARO in French 7 Jan 83 p 2

[Interview with Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie by Bernard Bonilauri; date and place not specified]

[Text] In his volume of political memoirs "Paris-Montpellier, PC-PSU, 1945-1965" (Gallimard, 1982), Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie wonders if destalinization has not drawn off from the PCF "free energies" which could be rediscovered in certain PS tendencies. "We should revert in this case to the important notion of broadened stalinism reflected on by Jean-Francois Revel," Ladurie writes. The key question is which of the two groups in power influences the other. "Let us recognize," the historian adds, "that in 1982 the French future remains completely open." It was tempting to ask Emmaneul Le Roy Ladurie whether or not the year which has just ended allowed confirmation of the "broadened stalinism" hypothesis in different domains.

[Question] It is first of all television that holds the interest of a great majority of French people. What do you think of it?

[Answer] For many people, television is the instrument of contact with a certain external world, for a fair number of French people do not read the press. The 8 p.m. televised news on the two major channels is their prime link to the political environment. And without falling into "broadened stalinism," the present system has nevertheless amplified the defects of the former one.

Television has no more freedom, as regards news bulletins, than it had in preceding presidential terms. In a sense, it is perhaps less free. Technically, it is not so much the president who intervenes heavily--he does that rather seldom--as his ministers, or socialist and communist militants. From time to time we see members of the opposition, but as a general rule, and for several months past, there has been a veritable parade of ministers. To that is added a frequent presence of the PCF through the medium of the OGT. For some time back, every time there has been reporting on a strike or an

enterprise, an opportunity was given to the CGT delegate--we might as well say to a representative of the local Communist cell--to speak in tones of pedantry.

From that viewpoint, we have witnessed a sort of rape of public opinion. Even on the least colonized channels, apart from praiseworthy efforts by certain journalists to provide genuine news, on Poland for example--I am thinking of Christine Ockrent and Poivre d'Arvor--a mixture of L'HUMANITE and LE POPULAIRE DU CENTRE was at times inflicted on the vast majority of French people. But the obligatory CGT, which has very often reigned over present-day television, especially when strikes were reported on, corresponds to the opinions of about 15 percent of our citizens.

As I see it, the present situation is worse than before. In Giscard's day, things were more open. Representatives of the opposition spoke regularly before the cameras. In Georges Marchais' case, it was said, the aim was to allow an opponent to make himself ridiculous. The fact remains that television was largely accessible to him. The former majority had no intellectual hegemony or characteristic ideology, other than what the Communist philosopher Louis Althusser called the dominant ideology--in other words, nothing much. The common denominator of the Socialist-Communist union corresponds to a somewhat Leninized form of Marxism. It manages to exert a powerful ideological constraint on communications media.

#### A State Newspaper

A share of responsibility rests with those in power before 10 May 1981, who were unable to liberalize the media. Had they done so, moreover, that conquest would not necessarily have been maintained by the authorities of the "Left." The frail status of radio and television in France has nothing in common with the great power wielded by the media in the United States. The existence of free radio stations--which have, I think, a rather small audience--does not have any great influence, and does little to change the terms of the problem. The total television system constituted by the state stations and even the peripheral stations subject to state influence, creates a scandalous situation in the eyes of a 19th century liberal--indeed for just a plain liberal: the existence of a state newspaper.

Under such conditions, what can possibly be the role of the High Authority presided by Michele Cotta? Its scope for action is narrowly limited, whatever the merit of the positions it has taken. Without too much hope, we would wish that the opposition, if some day it returns to power, will not be tempted to embark on allround abuses of it, and will once and for all liberalize the functioning of audiovisual media.

[Question] As an intellectual, you ascribe particular importance to cultural matters: does the attitude of Jack Lang arouse in you the critical reactions it sets off in many other professors and writers?

[Answer] On that plane we are subjected to hot and cold showers. The minister of culture supervises brilliant expositions to which he invites artists and creative people in whom there is very little of the ideologue. Fine! At the same time he multiplies startling and extremely questionable announcements. They are based on a simplistic anti-Americanism and an ill-considered Third Worldism, which seem to be shared by the minister of foreign affairs, to judge from some of his pro-Palestinian speeches.

Our cultural climate is distinguished by a kind of doubletalk. On the one hand, the continuity of French culture, which needs no guardian ministry to exist, is perpetuated above and beyond the vicissitudes of politics; on the other hand, Jack Lang at times makes statements which weaken his credibility. The same is true of Regis Debray, President Mitterrand's adviser for cultural affairs, who at times attacks a particular journalist. Having attacked Bernard Pivot, Debray then had to backtrack and criticize himself. That faux-pas did not interfere, however, with his keeping his post at the Elysee.

[Question] Do you think that in the field of research, at least, there exists that coherence which in your view is lacking in the cultural spokesmen?

[Answer] Jean-Pierre Chevenement showed a very clear determination to bring scientific research under the executive authority of his ministry, including--thanks to the influence he can exert through intermediaries--appointments of laboratory directors, even when those laboratories belong to large institutions outside the CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research] like the School for Higher Scientific Studies. The secretary of state for research in the Barre government, M Pierre Aigrin, was a remarkable physicist. That is not the case with the present minister, a man of politics, though estimable all the same.

Pierre Aigrin would never have allowed himself to exercise such control over scientific personnel. Today, everything happens as if considerations of power henceforth have as much importance as intellectual and scientific data. What is more, the Communist-led researchers' union is taking on more and more importance at the CNRS, to the detriment of pure researchers and professors who do not feel the call to be apparatchiks.

[Question] Can the researchers then hope to bring Jean-Pierre Chevenement to reconsider that decision?

[Answer] Insofar as protests like mine can have some effect--though I do not have too many illusions--scientists and professors can hope to modify the minister's orientations. Jean-Pierre Chevenement is imposing an organization which seems more and more to escape the initiative of scientists; such an organization reflects the requirements of a policy which in this case becomes inevitably politician.

[Question] Without going so far as the notion of "broadened stalinism," do not all your comments contain the idea that the Communist alliance influences Socialist behavior by hardening it?



Answer The PCF sees its prestige with the French diminishing because the Soviet model to which it refers intimidates more than it attracts. Communist infiltration and domination of certain sectors, particularly the media but others as well, does however make for an exaggerated hold on key executive positions.

In the automotive industry the Communists--pushed, it is true, by integrationist Moslem workers--are conducting a visible destabilization campaign. Perhaps they do not shrink from provoking a serious deficit at Peugeot-Citroen, to the point of making nationalization of that private firm inevitable. Thus could be constituted a totally nationalized branch of the automobile industry, as there exists a nationalized French Electricity. The final ideal would then be a partial closing of borders, and a similarly partial retreat from Europe. The taxpayer would then be asked to subsidize the costs of such an enterprise!

#### Faithful to 17th Century Economists

The negotiations between Socialists and Communists in anticipation of the municipal elections show that the PS is both the beneficiary and the victim of the alliance which was wanted by Francois Mitterrand's party. Socialist leaders continue to give pledges to the PCF, which shows less desire than ever for openness and liberalization. What are in fact the latest positions taken by Georges Marchais' friends? An old stalinist campaigner like Andre Wormser, in the columns of L'HUMANITE, defends the innocence of Yuri Andropov's Bulgarian friends.

As for Georges Marchais, he attacks Zinoviev, Valladares, or Sharansky, and makes astounding statements on the attempt against the Pope. He declares no one wants the "physical liquidation" of John Paul, as if the destiny of the Sovereign Pontiff could for an instant be compared to that of the Kamenevs and Zinovievs in the Moscow trials of the 30's. In the end, we can wonder what motive drives the PS, a democratic party, to maintain privileged relations with such rigid Communists.

It is not a matter of yielding to systematic anticommunism. The PCF has a legitimate place in this country. It embodies a municipal and trade union reality, but the presence of its members in the government remains unjustifiable.

When Francois Mitterrand decided to ally himself with the Communist group, was that really the Macchiavellian calculation of a future president anxious to assure himself of social peace? That interpretation rests on the highly questionable theory that the Communists have the capacity to launch a wave of agitation at any moment. Major strikes are not decreed; they are not triggered on command.

The victory of Felipe Gonzalez, in any case, proves that socialists can reduce communist strength without for all that associating it with the government. Nothing prevented Francois Mitterrand from taking an identical line.

In truth, it was the nostalgia and reveries of a political figure who had reached the pinnacle of the state, far more than the exigencies of French life, that brought the Communists to power.

Question Conversely, has not the PCF been under the sway of the PS? The Communists are obliged to support a policy of austerity they have always considered unbearable.

Answer In the USSR local Communists support an unbearable economic policy. With them, it is a habit. In various countries where Communists have been able to enter the government, the standard of living has tumbled down. Under conditions obviously very different, France is not much of an exception to that "law."

With Giscard, Barre, or Chirac, austerity would not have been spared us. But in view of the rather wild management which has marked the first Socialist year, and also owing to the mood of discouragement brought about in enterprises by the orientations of the present government, the bill we shall have to pay will be much heavier than it should.

Question Are you among those who doubt the government's competence in matters of economics?

Answer Within the PS there certainly is economic ignorance. A few of its members, highly placed in the apparatus or the state are hardly moved when France daily loses millions of dollars, which losses are due to the speculation and rashness of our leaders. Some of them seem to think that is only a paper exercise. They remain faithful to the most primitive of 17th century economists, for whom the only reality was a country's natural riches, and not its credit or currency resources.

#### The Teaching Monopoly

Question If we consider the intolerance shown by the PS toward private schools, do you not think there is among Socialists a militancy rivaling in virulence the Communist excesses you evoke?

Answer I think the PS remains mired in the tradition of "objective" anticlericalism, even though the church has changed a great deal for the better, but has also changed to the point of showing itself rather thoughtless in economic matters. We may be surprised, for example, that the bishops, in one among other interesting declarations, thought it opportune to call on couples to stop working, and that in order to create jobs. A somewhat strange recommendation.

It is surprising that the French church, while not for all that condemning the Socialist-Communist alliance (and we do not ask that of it), has never pointed out that union with the PCF poses questions of conscience for everyone, Christian or not. Union with totalitarianism is in no way innocent, and we still await an episcopal declaration, even a moderate one, on that subject. In truth, I think we shall wait a long time.

At times we have seen a kind of drift by the church, one of whose solid ties to good sense fortunately remains in its condemnation of equal refunds of abortion costs to all--a bit like support of Israel, which to Jean-Paul Sartre was one of the rare links to a reasonable policy. In spite of everything, prejudices against religious or Catholic teaching have not disappeared from the PS. Those Socialist attitudes perpetuate the anticlerical reflex, which had a certain justification at a time when the church represented a force of oppression, but has hardly any today. Those attitudes also illustrate the fact that the French Left has never made much effort to understand religious questions.

The government's school reform policy presents another aspect. It reflects a monopolistic will to power; it possesses or obsesses certain militants of the FEN [National Education Federation], which as everyone knows is very close to the PS. Teachers in public institutions already control a large part of the educational "market." That two million pupils in private institutions can escape their influence should not normally irritate them. FEN leaders, it would seem, constitute a lobby which wishes further to enlarge its power of control.

I belong to public education and am happy and proud of it. I consider that the profession of which I am a member is not at all deprived of influence, and therefore see no reason whatever to grant it the monopoly the PS strives to justify.

For my part, I have taught in countries where private initiative has an essential role, not only in secondary but in higher education. I was able to observe that that system had good results. The claim to monopoly by certain FEN leaders appears to me totally archaic and altogether to be condemned. It derives from a 19th century mentality; it is the demand of people who have seldom been outside France and who want to ignore sound systems existing abroad.

[Question] Is the pessimism you show concerning the present situation lessened when you reflect on a future solution?

[Answer] Personally, I imagine the opposition might return to power by a balance wheel reaction. But my feeling is that for France another scenario is needed. The evolution of democratic countries apparently conforms to a sort of logic: economic difficulties bring about electoral reverses from one extreme to another, from one pole to another. In England, laborites have yielded to conservatives; the Swedes have recalled Olof Palm's Socialists; and the German Social Democrats have had to withdraw in favor of the Christian Democrats.

The splitting of opinion into two blocs obviously favors transition from a Leftist iceberg to a Rightist one. That is a mechanical phenomenon against which it is difficult to act. In the case of France, moreover, the Leftist legislative record--aside from decentralization and various other points--

is not very convincing. A change would not necessarily be disastrous. But I find it disheartening that we could return to the former situation in which the actual opposition was purely and simply the former majority. A great many teachers, and a considerable portion of the new social classes which recognize each other in the PS would then be excluded from power once again. They could only feel frustration and alienation.

I am well aware that the heavily ideological tendency of today's PS leaves little hope to those who like myself would like an alliance between that party and certain forces of the present opposition. Such a formula would have the advantage of allowing the formation of a non-Communist government, and the relegation of the PCF, as I have said, to its "cherished occupations" in the municipalities and trade unions. In addition, it would avoid the excesses of the present politics, though without stirring up feelings of frustration and alienation on the part of millions of people in our mass intelligentsia whose wishes merit consideration and respect.

For that there are precedents. Despite its excessive instability, the Fourth Republic was not the detestable regime it is depicted to us. It had many merits, themselves founded on a coalition of socialists, centrists, and certain Gaullists. I fully concur with what Edgar Faure has said on the desirability of forming an enlarged center.

As things are, what I have just said is perhaps utopian. Nevertheless, I prefer that proposal for a conciliatory future to a pure and simple reversal of the pendulum to the opposite of the present situation. We can imagine the reprisals and weeding out which would follow. We might see--God forbid--some Quilles of the Right metaphorically cut off heads on the Left, just as at the Valence congress a Quilles of the Left arrogated to himself the right to decapitate those on the Right.

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## BRIEFS

FRENCH-GERMAN LOGISTICS EXERCISE--This exercise took place from 28 November to 3 December 1982 in Charente Maritime. Participating were the 519th Train Regiment, specialized in transshipment operations, and a German logistical battalion. What was involved was the unloading of two cargo shipments, one of them on the pier in the port of La Pallice, the other at sea with the assistance of the amphibious vehicles of the 519th Regiment. In all, 20 Leopard tanks, 8 vehicles, 1,000 tons of miscellaneous freight, 10 containers, and 1,3000 pallets belonging to the army of the Federal Republic of Germany were unloaded and forwarded by railroad to Germany. [Text] [Paris LA NOUVELLE REVUE MARITIME in French Jan 83 pp 105-106] 2662

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## GENERAL CLOSE OPPOSES PURCHASE OF MORE F-16 JETS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 29/30 Jan 83 p 2

[Interview by Pierre Bary with General Robert Close: "General Robert Close against the Purchase of F-16's, Delaying the Modernization of the Other Armed Forces"]

[Text] General Robert Close is opposed to the purchase of a second lot of 44 F-16's for the Air Force. General Close, who is the author of several works on the imbalance of forces as between the East and the West, and who became a PRL [Party of Liberty and Reform] senator for Brussels in the last legislative elections, stated to us, in an exclusive interview, that the purchase of these airplanes presents the risk of endangering the renovation of other materiel that is more indispensable for our forces. The chairman of his party's group on defense, he made a point of specifying that he was presenting his views on a personal basis.

[Question] Our first question: why this sort of tardy veto of the purchase of the F-16's, when it has been talked about for several months? Shouldn't something have been done at the beginning of 1982, since the decision in principle to buy these planes was taken by the government last July, and the present debate relates only to the modalities of the contract and the distribution of compensation?

[Answer] For the good reason that at the time when the problem was posed, the members of Parliament were not at all informed. Everything they knew, they had learned from reading the press. Whence a general dejection on the part of the members of the Parliament's defense committees, who had the feeling of being left out of the action, as had been the case when a choice had to be made between tracked vehicles and wheeled vehicles. Furthermore, the decision was taken to review our parliamentary working methods. Without the defunct joint committee being set up again, a single Chamber-Senate group is going to be created that will call on the military specialists only for dealing with the subjects under their competency.

I add that last October, at the time of the discussion of the 1982 defense budget in the Senate, I spoke vehemently with regard to the F-16's. I said that we were getting into an extravagant program without having the means for it. It is as if we were buying Rolls Royces when we needed jeeps! We have the air-



planes, but not the missiles to equip them with. We are falling into complete absurdity.

#### To the Detriment of the Land Force

[Question] You have been the commander of the Belgian armored division in the FRG, and might one think that your position is an example of the opposition that has always existed between the Land Force and the Air Force?

[Answer] I have always been careful to avoid taking part in such shabby quarrels. I regret the Air Force's being deprived of its combat missiles just as much as I regret the Land Force's being deprived of its antitank missiles. It matters to me only to know what we can do in an effective and credible manner within the framework of our budgetary package. But I cannot go along with the Land Force's being penalized in a way by the Air Force's reequipment orders. Thus, in the 1983 budget, the former will have to accept a transfer of BF 3 billion to pay for the F-16's of the first installment.

[Question] Is that the reason for your opposition to the ordering of a second lot of F-16's?

[Answer] Basically, I am not opposed to this order, which does indeed figure in the 10-year plan, for renewal of our forces' material. But I cannot go along with this purchase's doing harm to other purchases, to the point of endangering our country's general effort for its security.

The second installment of F-16's comes as a second priority in the 10-year plan, after the Land Force's programs for replacement of artillery and acquisition of antitank helicopters. With the slipping-away of the means of payment necessary for the second lot of F-16's, those two priority programs are going to suffer a slip of at least 2 or 3 years. And even this is an optimistic view of matters, because in the climate of budgetary restrictions, instead of having a 3-percent increase in expenditures in real terms in 1982, as in 1978 we made a commitment to Washington to do, we have arrived at a decrease on the order of 6.2 percent. If we had taken account of the rise of the dollar, the currency in which most payments are made, it would have been necessary to increase this budget on the order of 14 to 15 percent. We are quite a long way from that.

#### The F-16's Weight

[Question] According to you, does the F-16 weigh too much financially, to the point of imbalancing our entire defense effort, at the risk of losing our credibility with the Atlantic Alliance?

[Answer] I fear that for lack of sufficient financial means, our troops are at the limit of their ability to operate. In the FRG in particular, where they have a front of 50 km to control out of the 800 km of border that separates us from the countries of the East. They must have rapid means of transport from their rear, artillery that shoots as far as does that of the adversary, and instruments of antitank warfare, especially helicopters armed with missiles, the use of which is more and more required. But we are nowhere in all these urgent and indispensable programs.

[Question] In the Senate, had you already launched a veritable cry of alarm about the current situation of the Land Force?

[Answer] For reasons of a budgetary nature, we are witnessing a progressive impoverishment of that force. The number of days of maneuvers has dropped from 60 to 45 to 22. Under these conditions, it is not possible to train personnel properly for combat. This has a psychological impact on the young men, who have the feeling of wasting their time. It is not always even possible to equip the militiamen as should be done. They sometimes wait weeks to receive their military uniform and footwear suitable for operations. The cumulative delays in making new materiel available make it necessary to prolong the life-time of the old materiel, at great expense. Thus, the Rocourt shops devote most of their time to producing spare parts for the AMX, parts that it has become impossible to find on the market. We are also continuing to patch up jeeps that date from just after World War II.

#### Reflecting on Our Investments

[Question] In your view, are the F-16's like the straw that breaks the camel's back?

[Answer] I think, in effect, that the time has come to reflect on our military investment policy. We do not have the means for doing everything at once, and we have to choose. Again, I have nothing against combat planes. All I ask is that the order of priorities not be overturned for them, as Minister Vreven --who has declared that he would resign if forced into it--has committed himself to doing. If the purchase of the F-16's is linked to rescue of the aeronautical industry, one could perhaps find financing for them outside the National Defense package, by assigning to them the amount of TVA [Value-Added Tax] that the state collects on the armed forces' fuel expenditures, and by asking for special aid from the minister of economic affairs and from the regional authorities.

Why is it necessary for National Defense to continue to bear all the supplemental expense resulting from the compensations programs? The armored vehicles for transport of infantry troops that we manufacture in Belgium cost us 40-percent more than if we had ordered them, completely made, from the United States. The policy on equipment of our forces is not dictated in function of the interests of our defense but rather in function of the interests of industrial pressure groups. It is not the armed forces that ask industry to meet their needs; rather, industry is imposing its choices on us.

[Question] Has a good deal of equivocation arisen from these compensations?

[Answer] In conclusion, I would say to you that I don't give a s... about the compensations, but that I don't have that attitude about responsibility for human lives. It is the enormous responsibility that one has on one's shoulders when one sends people into combat. The only question that arises is whether they have been given the best chance for survival. The answer, unfortunately, is no. As Mendes-France said, never sacrifice the future for the present: this is the supreme duty of the statesman. And we are doing the contrary!

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## SUBMARINE, REFUELING SHIP, FRIGATE MOVEMENTS FOR NOV-DEC 1982

Paris LA NOUVELLE REVUE MARITIME in French Jan 83 pp 106-107

[Excerpts] The tanker "Var" sailed from Brest on 3 November 1982 for the long voyage which always precedes the entry of new vessels into active service. During this voyage it engaged in exercises with the "Jeanne d'Arc" group as well as with the Atlantic squadron as was seen earlier. The "Var" also called at New Orleans from 24 to 29 November 1982 and then at Quebec City from 8 to 11 December 1982. It returned to Brest on 20 December 1982.

The oceanographic vessel "Entrecasteaux" left Brest on 4 November 1982 for a 5-month mission in the Antilles. Its return to Brest is anticipated for early April 1983.

The attack submarine "La Praya," which had arrived in Djibouti on 12 October 1982 for an extensive mission (5 months) of showing the flag and endurance in the Indian Ocean called at Port-des-Galets, Reunion island, from 26 November to 2 December 1982.

The nuclear attack submarine "Rubis," on an endurance mission before its definitive entry into active service made a call at Fort-de-France from 2 to 12 December 1982 after its participation in the inter-squadron maneuvers.

At the conclusion of its assistance mission in the fishing operations offshore from Newfoundland, the ocean tug "Malabar" left Saint Pierre on 2 December 1982. After calling at Punta Delgada (Azores) from 8 to 10 December, it reached Brest on 15 December 1982.

During this voyage the "Malabar" gave assistance to the trawlers "Capitaine Pleven," "Victor Pleven," "Dauphin," "Islande," "Saint Pierrais," "Normandie," "Croix de Lorraine," and "Neve." Forty parcels and 1,200 letters were distributed or collected and a ton of materials was transshipped. The medical team of the "Malabar" performed six medical and nine dental examinations. It also gave assistance to the roll-on, roll-off cargo vessel "Langlade" which had run aground east of Pointe du Soldat in Miquelon island in the night of 4 to 5 November 1982. Despite very difficult conditions--a sea with a force of 7-- the "Malabar" finally succeeded in refloating the "Langlade" on its third attempt on Sunday, 7 November, towing the vessel to the port of Saint Pierre.

The aviso "Commandant de Pimodan" of the Mediterranean naval fleet, on loan to the Indian Ocean region as temporary reinforcement replacing the "D'Estienne d'Orves," sailed from Toulon on 26 November. It reached Djibouti on 7 December 1982.

After participating in the exercises in the Atlantic off Gibraltar mentioned earlier, the frigate "Duguay-Trouin" and the squadron escort "Casabianca" sailed to the Gulf of Guinea for a show-the-flag mission dubbed "Okoume 82." The frigate called at Conakry from 29 November to 2 December 1982 while the "Casabianca" was visiting Monrovia, the capital of Liberia. The group is scheduled to return to Brest at the end of January 1983 after visiting Ivory Coast (The "Duguay-Trouin" was in Abidjan from 10 to 13 December), Dahomey [Benin] ("Casabianca" from 10 to 14 December), Gabon, Cameroon, and Togo.

The boom and mooring vessel "Fourmi," normally stationed in Toulon, was temporarily assigned to the port directorate of Brest during the mission of the Regional Support Vessel (BSR) "Chamois" in Polynesia.

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## PROPULSION, WEAPONRY OF NEW ANTI-AIR CORVETTES

Paris LA NOUVELLE REVUE MARITIME in French Jan 83 pp 107-112

[Excerpts] The corvette "Jean de Vienne" (D 643) the fourth unit of the C 70 ASM [antisubmarine] type, was commissioned for trials on 20 November 1982. Theoretically, it should enter active service in 1984.

It differs slightly from the three earlier corvettes (the "Goerges Leygues," "Dupleix," and "Montcalm") by virtue of its armament and some of its equipment. Just as the "Montcalm," it carries four MM 40 Exocet missiles which may be fired beyond the horizon. Room for another four missiles is being planned. Regarding equipment, this is the first C 70 ASM corvette to be endowed with two Dagaie chaff grenade launchers (built by CSEE [Signals and Electrical Enterprises Company]) and with towed DUBV 43 variable depth sonar.

Two anti-air corvettes are included in the 1983 budget, a budget that will be analyzed further on in this issue. They are the third and fourth in a series of air defense vessels called upon to replace the type T 47 "Tartar" squadron escorts which have begun to be withdrawn from service with the decommissioning of the "Bouvet." The first prefabricated sections of the prototype were assembled in the fall of 1982 at the large dock of the Lorient arsenal.

The principal mission of these craft is to insure the defense of a sizable naval force against an air attack that can, now and in the future, include various aspects: By attack aircraft but also anti-ship missiles launched by surface vessels, submerged submarines, or aircraft, whether planes or helicopters, it being considered that missiles of the "sea skimmer" type are the most dangerous. This action may occur in the maritime approaches to French territory, on the high seas, or on the occasion of a rapid assistance operation. The secondary mission of these corvettes is to attack surface enemy forces. Finally, there are plans to outfit them with a sound anti-submarine self-defense system.

Thanks to information not previously published and made available to the REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DEFENSE on the occasion of the most recent Naval Show at Le Bourget, the characteristics of these corvettes are better known now.

They have the same hull as the C 70 type antisubmarine corvettes, but their

propulsion is different since this class of corvettes has only diesel engines instead of a combination of diesel and gas turbine power plants. Such an arrangement was finally approved because the use of gas turbines, requiring large areas in the upper structures (smokestack, air intake valves, etc.), would not have permitted on a craft of some 4,000 tons the installation under optimal conditions of all the equipment specific to the anti-air vessel. Also, the recent advances in the field of diesel engines with power plants operating at low compression rates have reached the point where, with only four BTC diesel engines, it is possible to generate a maximum power close to that of the two Rolls Royce Olympus gas turbines outfitting the C 70 ASM corvette and thus to reach a maximum speed of about 30 knots.

Since the decision to build these corvettes was taken, their specifications have been modified several times to take into account operational requirements, the change in techniques, and the projections of the threats which they will have to meet in the 20 years following their entry into service. As finally approved these characteristics are as follows:

--Displacement: 4,300 tons fully loaded.

--Dimensions: 139 x 14 x 45.50 meters.

--Propulsion: 4 diesel SEMT-Pielstick 18PA6 BTC engines developing aggregate power of 31,760 kilowatts [as published; probably, horsepower] and driving two fixed-rate propellers.

--Electric power: 3,400 kilowatts (4 diesel 850-kilowatt alternators).

--Performance:

a. Maximum speed: 30 knots;

b. Range: 5,000 miles at 24 knots; 8,000 miles at 17 knots.

--Very abundant armament including:

a. Air defense:

One surface-to-air SM-1 MR missile system coming--after revision and retrofitting in the United States--from the condemned squadron escorts. It is the SM-1MR of the "Bouvet" which will equip the first of these new corvettes. Single-barrel Mk-13 launcher whose ammunition is fed by a vertical cylinder containing 40 missiles. Range of 50,000 meters; height of interception, 60 to 80,000 feet.

One 100-millimeter compact cannon in the fore of the craft firing 80 to 90 rounds of ammunition a minute.

Two Sadral very short-range surface-to-air missile systems each of which includes six very rapid missiles capable of checking at very short range any attacking missile, including those of the "sea skimmer" type. The missiles



are mounted on a light turret designed by the CSEE. The missile, developed by MATRA [general Mechanical Aeronautics Company, Propulsion Section] is 1.80 meters long, has a diameter of 0.09 meter, and weighs 17 kg. Its military payload is 3 kg. A nearby powder-room makes it possible to load the system rapidly.

Two 20-millimeter cannons (1 x 2).

b. Antiship defense:

Eight MM 40 Exocet missiles (2 four-barrelled launchers) with the potential of trans-horizon firing guidance by a light helicopter.

The aforementioned 100-millimeter gun turret.

The light helicopter equipped with antiship missiles.

c. Antisubmarine defense:

Two fixed catapults for the launching of L-5 type torpedoes (10 torpedoes).

a. Equipment for navigation, air detection, and aircraft guidance:

One DRBJ-11B radar (Thomson-CSF) with volumetric backup using electronic sweep hooked up the following:

One DRBV 26 long-range air backup radar.

Two Decca 1229 radar units one of which is used for the guidance of the helicopter.

Two AN/SPG 51C firing guidance radars hooked up to the SM-1 MR missile system.

One multisensor firing guidance system (DRBC 33 Naja optronic radar, etc.).

One Vampir system (Thomson-CSF) for the detection of infrared sources operating in the vessel's self-defense zone.

b. Equipment for electronic warfare:

Two Sagaie chall grenade launchers (CSEE) insuring the defense of the zone through the scrambling and dissipation of the adversary's operational defense capabilities be they air-to-sea, sea-to-surface, or surface-to-surface whether with radar, infrared, or mixed guidance systems.

Two Dagaie chaff grenade launchers (CSEE) for closer defense against these same types of missiles.

One ARBB 33 scrambler.

One ARBR 17 radar detector.

d. Equipment for submarine detection:

One DUBA 25 middle frequency stem-post sonar; and finally,

One towed passive linear sonar.


The use of these various sensors and firing guidance are controlled at the operational command by a SENIT 6 computer. This data-processing system designed by the Naval Programming Center integrates several computers of the 15 M type with the help of digital hookups (BUS standard marine). Each of the computers is responsible for one or several functions: External communications (11 and 14), air watch, electronic warfare, SM-1 MR system, gunnery, etc., with a total of more than 15 specially designed display console (Cinsor) to facilitate the work of the operators. In case of breakdown or corrections, it is then easier to proceed with a new computation than in a more centralized system such as the earlier SENIT 3 and 4.

Finally, the anti-air corbetees will, for internal communications, be equipped with a system somewhat similar to the BUS which will greatly facilitate the use of communications on the vessel. Very light, it will make it possible to reduce considerably the layers of cable which used to block the gangways and premises on earlier versions of the craft.

The training ship "Le Tigre" was launched on 8 October 1982 at the La Perriere Shipyards and Workyards in Lorient. It is part of a class of eight 463-ton vessels doing 15 knots which have been ordered at the rate of five craft [all figures as published] from the Workyards and Shipyards of La Manche and five units from La Perriere. They are intended to replace the former American MSC type minesweepers. The three initial units ordered from the La Manche shipyards are in service--"Leopard" (A 748), "Panthere" (A 749), and "Jaguar" (A 750).

The first two of a series of 12 equipment transportation lighters (CTM) were delivered to the French Navy on 19 and 27 October 1982 at the Mechanical Constructions Enterprise of Normandy in Cherbourg.

The 16th A 69-type aviso under construction was named "Commandant Birot."



Key to plan of anti-air corvettes:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. Light helicopter                       | 7. MM 60 Exocet missile launch ramps      |
| 2. Sadral system                          | 8. Dagaie chaff grenade launchers         |
| 3. Mk-13 launch ramp                      | 9. Sagaie chaff grenade launchers         |
| 4. SPG 51C firing guidance radar units    | 10. DRBV-26 radar unit                    |
| 5. DRBJ-11 radar units                    | 11. Compact 100-millimeter cannon turret. |
| 6. Syracuse satellite transmission system |   |

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